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ABSTRACT
As the United States is attempting to strengthen its domes-
tic economy and shrink its military forces, the military is
being confronted with the results of ignorant or abusive
policies toward the environment that have wreaked havoc at
many installations. This thesis examines the contracting
process which the Department of Defense uses to remediate,
or cleanup, hazardous waste sites.
Many situations encountered in the environmental restoration
process require flexibility and innovation, yet DoD's most
common system for contracting for remediation work does not
always meet those requirements. In addition, the exorbitant
costs the nation and DoD face in cleaning up hazardous waste
sites are partially driven by two factors: a misallocation
of risk in the contracting process and poor technologies.
Since the military weapons acquisition process must treat
similar conditions of uncertainty and has managed to do so
while successfully developing new technologies, DoD should
attempt to capture the benefits of its experience. The
study found nineteen lessons learned from the defense indus-
try that are applicable to environmental restoration. One
environmental contracting combination which would recognize
uncertainty and also encourage innovation is a cost-plus-
award-fee contract for the completion of the study portions
of the project, followed by a separate design-build contract
for the execution of the project. This design-build con-
tract would be a cost-plus-fixed-fee contract which would be
converted to a fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract.
Both procurements would be negotiated, not bid. The study
also found that no single contracting method could address
every situation that might be encountered during environmen-
tal restoration, and that there will always be a number of
obstacles which will hinder the process.
Thesis Supervisor: Dr. Fred Moavenzadeh
Title: Director, Center for Construction Research
and Education
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GLOSSARY
acquisition - purchase of supplies or services
allowable costs - expenses incurred by a contractor which
can be reimbursed because they fall within the terms of
a particular contract
alternative (or innovative) contracting - a procurement
other than by traditional contracting
ARARs - applicable or relevant and appropriate requirements:
applicable requirements are those cleanup standards,
standards of control, and other substantive
environmental protection requirements promulgated under
Federal or state law that specifically address a
hazardous substance remedial action, or other
circumstance at a CERCLA site; relevant and appropriate
requirements are those cleanup standards, standards of
control, and other substantive environmental protection
requirements promulgated under Federal or state law
that are not applicable to a CERCLA site but are
sufficiently similar to those encountered at the CERCLA
site and thus their use is well suited at the site. In
effect, ARARs are "the letter of the law and the spirit
of the law."
available technologies - those cleanup methods fully proven
and in routine commercial use so that sufficient cost
and performance data exists
CERCLA - Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation,
and Liability Act of 1980
contract administration - the process of planning and then
executing a formal written agreement between two
parties
cost-plus (or cost-type) contract - an agreement in which
all allowable costs are reimbursed
cost-plus-award-fee contract - a cost-type contract that
provides for a fee consisting of a base amount fixed at
the inception of the contract and an award amount that
the contractor can earn in whole or in part based on
his quality, timeliness, technical ingenuity, and/or
cost-effective management
cost-plus-fixed-fee contract - a cost-type contract that
provides for payment to the contractor of a negotiated
fee that is fixed at the inception of the contract and
does not vary with the actual costs; the fee may be
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adjusted only as a result of changes in the work to be
performed under the contract
DERA - Defense Environmental Restoration Account: a special
DoD account which is fenced for DERP expenditures only
DERP - Defense Environmental Restoration Program: DoD's
program to identify and remediate hazardous waste sites
and to reduce the production of future hazardous wastes
design-build - a procurement in which a single contractor is
responsible for the detailed design of a product or
facility as well as for the manufacture or construction
of his designed item
DoD - U. S. Department of Defense
DoE - U. S. Department of Energy
DPM - Defense Priority Model: an automated system used by
DoD to help prioritize the use of DERP funds
EFD - Engineering Field Division, one of the regional
contracting organizations under NAVFACENGCOM
environmental restoration - the process of identifying a
hazardous waste site and returning it to its former
condition
EPA - U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
FAR - Federal Acquisition Regulations: the laws and rules by
which the U. S. government must contract
FFA - Federal Facility Agreement: an interagency agreement
(between DoD, EPA, and the state agencies as
applicable) on the cleanup action selected for a
hazardous waste site, the alternatives that could have
been taken, the action selected, the schedule for
completion of each cleanup action, and long-term
operation and maintenance plans for the site
fixed-price contract - an agreement in which the firm price,
ceiling price, or target price (as applicable) is set
at the inception of the contract and is subject to
change only under contract clauses providing for
equitable adjustment
fixed-price incentive (firm target) contract - a fixed-price
contract which specifies at the outset a target cost,
target profit, a price ceiling (but not a profit
ceiling or floor), and a profit adjustment formula;
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when the contractor completes performance, the parties
negotiate the final cost and the final price is
established by applying the formula (up to the ceiling
price)
FS - Feasibility Study: the development of cleanup
alternatives for a hazardous waste site, screening of
those alternatives for their effectiveness,
implementability and cost, followed by a detailed
analysis of those alternatives which pass the initial
screening
hazardous waste site - an area in which contaminants are
uncontrolled and which may present a danger to human
health or the environment
incentive-type contract - an agreement in which the
contractor's profit or fee is related to his
performance
innovative technologies - those cleanup methods for which
performance information is incomplete
interim response - the immediate extraction of contaminants
from a hazardous waste site, before the completion of
the study, because of the danger presented by the
substances
IR Program - Installation Restoration Program: the portion
of DERP which addresses the cleanup of hazardous waste
sites
IRTCC - Installation Restoration Technology Coordinating
Committee: a DoD working group which coordinates
environmental technology research, development, and
implementation programs among the individual services
NAVFACENGCOM (or NAVFAC) - the Naval Facilities Engineering
Command: the Navy organization with primary
responsibility for facility planning, acquisition and
management for the Navy and Marine Corps
negotiated contract - any agreement which is awarded by
methods other than competitive bidding based on lowest
price
NFRAP - no further response action planned: a site that EPA
or the Navy has determined that does not warrant moving
further in the site evaluation process
NPL - National Priorities List: the listing of sites that
qualify for the Superfund program
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PA - Preliminary Assessment: a desktop review of existing
data about a hazardous waste site to determine if any
releases may have occurred
PRP - Potentially Responsible Party: an individual or
organization with some connection to a hazardous waste
site who thus might be financially liable for all or
part of the cleanup costs
RA - Remedial Action: construction and/or operation of a
cleanup system at a hazardous waste site
RD - Remedial Design: production of plans and specifications
which show remediation methods and construction
Materials for a particular hazardous waste site
remediation - the process of cleaning up and returning a
site to its pre-polluted condition
removal action - the immediate extraction of contaminants
from a hazardous waste site, before the completion of
the study, because of the danger presented by the
substances
responsible bidder (or offerer) - a contractor who,
according to guidelines in the FAR and the contract
solicitation, meets the government's criteria for
entering into a contract with the government
responsive bid (or offer) - a bid which meets all
requirements stated in the advertisement for the
potential contract
RI - Remedial Investigation: a more intense study of a
hazardous waste site which attempts to determine the
nature and extent of contamination and to characterize
the public health and environmental risks
risk - uncertainty, or the variability of possible outcomes
ROD - Record of Decision: selection (by EPA) of the
preferred cleanup method for a hazardous waste site,
considering both technical analysis and the public's
input through local hearings, and documentation of the
rationale for the selected remedy.
ROICC - Resident Officer in Charge of Construction: the Navy
official responsible for administering construction
contracts at Navy and Marine Corps installations
RPM - Remedial Project Manager
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SARA - Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986
service (or military service) - one of the individual
components under DoD (Army, Air Force, Navy or Marine
Corps)
SI - Site Investigation: a combined visual and sampling
inspection of a hazardous waste site to determine if
releases have in fact occurred and to verify the need
for any immediate corrective measures
strict liability - responsibility for damages subsequent to
some event, even though there is no direct proof of
cause and effect between the event and any injury or
damage
Superfund - the account established to fund activities under
CERCLA/SARA; more commonly, the Acts themselves
third party liability - responsibility for damages,
resulting from performance under a contract, to someone
who was not a party to the contract
traditional contracting - an agreement in which all plans
and specifications are drafted, advertised for bid, and
awarded to the lowest bidder based solely on his price
weapons system - military hardware, including all
subsystems, training devices, computer resources and
support items, which is designed to perform a
particular military mission
weapons system development - the design, engineering and
testing of a weapon system in an effort to reach the
final configuration of the system
weapons system production - manufacturing of multiple units
of a weapons system based on its final design
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1INTRODUCTION
1.1 General
Burgeoning world populations and the quest for
industrial/economic development have begun
seriously to erode the capability of the earth's
environment to sustain itself...Environmental
degradation is a physical manifestation created by
man, but it impacts on man not only physically,
but socially, politically and economically. The
national security implications of environmental
degradation derive, therefore, from this social,
political and economic impact...National security,
therefore, must be viewed in a context outside the
traditional concept of military capability.1
As the United States approaches the twenty-first
century, the nation is facing staggering changes in the
world's political, social and economic order. Communism has
failed, nationalism is sparking both peaceful and
revolutionary changes in governments, nations are attempting
to assess the Earth's environmental health and are meeting
to debate global responsibilities for the planet's survival,
and world economies are consolidating and restructuring in
an effort to promote growth.
Amidst this unsettling picture, the United States is
striving to assert its status as a world leader. Part and
parcel with this effort comes an attempt to strengthen the
xJohn D. Schlegel, Environmental Degradation: Implications
for National Security. Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: Army War
College, March 1990, pp. ii and 3.
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domestic economy, which includes (among other challenges)
the downsizing of American military forces. Installations
in the continental United States (CONUS) and overseas are
being closed and realigned as troop reassignments and force
restructuring dictates.
At both the bases that are closing and at those that
will remain part of the U. S. defense structure, the
military is being confronted with a new enemy - itself.
Past decades of ignorant, ill-informed and even outright
abusive policies toward the environment have wreaked havoc
at many installations.
Since a country's military and its practices reflect
the norms and values of the nation it serves, it is only
natural that the U. S. Department of Defense (DoD) has
adopted a new environmental ethic. As the nation has become
more environmentally conscious, so too has the military.
DoD is firmly committed to conducting its operations in ways
that are environmentally sound and to cleaning up the
problems of the past. What good is national defense if the
nation which is being defended is a dumpsite?
The objective of this thesis is to examine the process
which DoD uses to remediate, or cleanup, hazardous waste
sites. In particular, the focus is on the aspects of the
remediation process which relate to contracting. Since the
majority of the steps in the remediation process are
performed by private sector contractors under DoD
-13-
supervision, it is prudent to continually seek improvements
in the contracting process in an effort to realize more
value for the taxpayers' dollar. In addition to providing
higher quality in the basic services which are being bought
by contract, certain changes to the contracting process can
also stimulate innovation in the private sector remediation
markets; this aspect of the DoD remediation process is a key
sidelight to the basic study of the contracting process.
This thesis follows a basic problem-discussion-
recommendation format. Chapter 2 lays the foundation for a
study of the environmental restoration contracting process
by describing DoD's environmental restoration program and
its relation to other national environmental programs. The
chapter also reveals the scope of the DoD cleanup challenge.
Chapter 3 analyzes the advantages and disadvantages of the
current DoD environmental restoration contracting process by
examining the nature of the work, the market which executes
the work, and the particular ways in which risk is allocated
and contracts are implemented. Chapter 4 analyzes similar
characteristics for another area of DoD contracting
expertise: weapons contracting. Chapter 5 provides
recommendations for improvements to the environmental
restoration contracting process by applying some of the
lessons learned from weapons contracting; in addition, the
chapter addresses some of the barriers to changing the
existing methods and also comments on some aspects of the
-14-
contract administration process which are relevant to those
"in the trenches" trying to get the job of remediation done.
Chapter 6 closes the thesis with some brief conclusions and
recommendations for further research.
In an effort to maintain some semblance of focus, the
thesis does not attempt to layout all the ills of the
Superfund program or DoD's parallel program, but reviews
them only to provide the framework in which the remediation
contracting process takes place. This thesis also does not
examine the role of DoD as a possible linchpin for changing
the entire Superfund process, especially in the area of
innovation, as this topic has been studied in some detail by
other writers;2 rather, innovation in remediation
technology is treated as a corollary benefit of changes made
while trying to improve the basic contracting methodology.
Finally, it should be noted that the majority of the
procedures examined are those of the United States Navy,
because that is the organization with which I am intimately
familiar. However, my research leads me to believe that the
procedures and practices in other elements of the Department
of Defense are sufficiently similar that the analysis
performed and recommendations made could be translated to
the other services with relative ease.
2See the MIT theses by Dornstauder and Rossi (referenced in
the bibliography of this thesis).
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BACKGROUND
2.1 General
Defense and the environment is not an either/or
proposition. To choose between these is
impossible in this real world of serious defense
threats and genuine environmental concerns.
Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney3
One of the Department of Defense's genuine
environmental concerns is cleaning up its "sins of the
past." The focus of this thesis is on the remediation
activities under the military's Installation Restoration
(IR) Program because it is DoD's program for cleaning up
that toxic contamination at its installations.
To provide a framework for this study, Chapter 2 lays
the foundation of the environmental restoration contracting
process by describing the legislation and policies which
guide the nation's efforts to cleanup its civilian hazardous
waste sites, and then relates DoD's environmental
restoration programs to these other national environmental
programs. The chapter also reveals the scope of the DoD
cleanup challenge in terms of number of sites and expected
costs.
3 Defense Environmental Restoration Program, Annual Report to
Congress for Fiscal Year 1990. U. S. Department of Defense,
February 1991, Introduction.
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2.2 CERCLA/SARA Overview
2.2.1 The CERCLA/SARA Cleanup Process
In order to understand the military's methodology for
cleaning up hazardous wastes sites, one should look first to
the methods employed in the civilian sector under the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) as amended by the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),
collectively referred to as "Superfund."
CERCLA became law in December 1980 primarily as a
result of public outcry over well-publicized incidents
involving hazardous materials and wastes at places like Love
Canal, New York, and Times Beach, Missouri. The initial
"Superfund" of $1.6 billion was created to fund
investigations and cleanups of abandoned or disputed sites
where no 'potential responsible party' (PRP) could be found
to foot the cleanup bill. SARA reauthorized the provisions
of the expiring CERCLA, enacted amendments to the original
legislation based on lessons learned from the first five
years, and provided a second dose of $8.5 billion into
Superfund to cure the nation's hazardous waste ills. 4
The methodology to be followed when cleaning up a
hazardous waste site is described in CERCLA/SARA and various
4Andrew Hoffman. The Hazardous Waste Remediation Market:
Innovative Technological Development and the Growing Involvement
of the Construction Industry. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Thesis
submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, September, 1991, pp. 20-23.
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publications of the U. S. Environmental Protection Agency
(EPA). Figure 2.1 outlines the complete environmental
restoration process flow. An explanation
components
SDISCOVERY & PRELIMINARY
NOTIFICATION ASSESSMENT
of the major
of each step follows.
REMEDIAL ACTION PROCESS
INSPECTIO
TREATABILIT Y
CHAACTERIZATION INVESTIGATION
A-L AL DEVELOP SCREENAI DE'
ALTERNATIVES ALTERNATIVES ALTEFAN
NOTE: (1) It situation warrants, removals or long-term
monitoring may be Implemented at most of
(2) This process oan be modilfied to meet
eit*-specilfo needs
Figure 2.1 - The Remedial Action Process
(From the Navy/Marine Corps IR Manual)
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PA/SI
IndentifIcation
RI/FS
In vesgallion
RD/RA
Cleanup
SC
Site Closeout
Optional Aotions
NFRAP declison may be
made here
The major tasks in each step are:.5
1. Preliminary Assessment (PA) - a desktop review of
existing data about the site (such as EPA files, property
records, etc.) to determine if any releases may have
occurred, to predict the need for any immediate corrective
measures ("removal actions"), and to establish the priority
and focus of the SI.
2. Site Investigation (SI) - a combined visual and
sampling inspection of the site to determine if releases
have in fact occurred, to verify the need for any immediate
corrective measures ("removal actions"), and to establish
the priority and focus of the RI (should one be necessary).
If the initial screening of the site shows contamination, a
second phase "listing" site inspection occurs where
additional data is gathered about the site.
3. Hazard Ranking System (HRS) Scoring - an evaluation
of the information from the PA/SI and a comparison of the
hazards discovered at the site to established standards. If
the site scores higher than a certain "cutoff" score, it
makes the National Priorities List (NPL) and becomes subject
to CERCLA/SARA (i.e., it is now in the Superfund arena).
Those sites that have contamination but are below the
Superfund threshold are referred to the states and then come
OCondensed from Camp, Dresser, & McKee. Course Notes: MIT
Course 1.972 "Environmental Restoration Engineering." (Lecture
2.0). Cambridge, Massachusetts: Department of Civil Engineering,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Spring 1991.
-19-
under their jurisdiction.
4. Remedial Investigation (RI) - a more intense study
of the site which attempts to determine the nature and
extent of contamination, to characterize the public health
and environmental risks through a preliminary risk
assessment, and to refine the site data needs to ensure
sufficient data quality for the analysis of alternatives
during the FS.
5. Feasibility Study (FS) - the development of cleanup
alternatives, screening of those alternatives for their
effectiveness, implementability and cost, followed by a
detailed analysis of those alternatives which pass the
initial screening. The FS is often performed in an
iterative manner with the RI step (rather than in a
sequential fashion).
6. Remedy Selection and Record of Decision (ROD) -
selection (by EPA) of the preferred cleanup method,
considering both the technical analysis performed to date
and the public's input through local hearings, and
documentation of the rationale for the selected remedy.
7. Remedial Design (RD) - production of plans and
specifications which show particular remediation methods and
construction materials for a site.
8. Remedial Action (RA) - construction and/or
operation of a cleanup system at a site.
9. Site Closeout (SC) - removal of the site from the
-20-
NPL upon satisfactory completion of the restoration.
For a particular site, the process may differ slightly
because some wastes present an imminent public danger and
require an immediate removal action. Some areas may be
split into "operable units," where various pieces of the
site are separated and tracked independently throughout the
remediation process. Still other sites may require no
further response action based on the results of previous
steps. Figure 2.2 illustrates the process for these
situations.
For the purposes of this thesis, the entire remedial
action process will be examined in light of the contracting
aspects involved at each step.
2.2.2 CERCLA/SARA Impacts on DoD
Although Superfund is written for private sector
hazardous waste sites, the passage of SARA made the program
mandatory for Federal facilities. Since DoD must comply
with the same procedures, the above analysis of the
Superfund remediation process serves as an important tool in
understanding the philosophy used by DoD to contract for
these services.
SARA also impacts DoD because it imposes strict
-21-
Removals, No Further Action, Operable Units and Continued Site
Monitoring in Relation to the Remedial Action Process
Removals
Re
mov
a ls Re
mo
v a ls
Continued Site Monitoring
Continued
Site Monitoring
4..SR.............
c Subsequent Phase Is Optional
* Subsequent Phase Is Expected
No Further Action
No Further Action
Operable Units
RD/RA,1
Ri/FS RD/RA 2 RA3 RA
RD/RA 5 RA6
Figure 2.2 - Variations on the Remediation Process
(From the Navy/Marine Corps IR Manual)
timetables and schedules for compliance, including:.
- Federal facilities have no more than 6 months to
commence an RI/FS once a site has been placed on the NPL.
- The Federal agency involved has no more than 180
days after the EPA has reviewed the RI/FS to enter into an
interagency agreement with EPA for the "expeditious
OExcerpted from Navy/Marine Corps Installation Restoration
(IR) Manual. Washington, D. C.: Office of the Chief of Naval
Operations, February 1992, pp. 1-2.
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completion" of all necessary remedial action on the Federal
NPL site.
- At Federal facilities subject to interagency
agreements, remedial actions shall be completed as
expeditiously as practicable.
- Other reporting and disclosure requirements.
2.3 The DERP/IR Cleanup Process
2.3.1 The Defense Environmental Restoration Program
(DERP)
Executive Order 12580 delegated the President's
authority under CERCLA and SARA to the various Federal
agencies, including DoD. As stated earlier, the Department
of Defense follows the same basic steps (as listed in
Section 2.2.1) for restoration of their hazardous waste
sites. However, funds for the remediation of DoD sites are
not provided by the Superfund account but rather by the
Defense Environmental Restoration Account, a special DoD
account which is part of the annual Defense Appropriations
Act. In any event, the same broad strategy of identifying
possible sites, studying the sites in detail, then designing
and implementing a solution to the problems is used by DoD
and other federal agencies.
This cleanup strategy was implemented and became DoD
policy under the Defense Environmental Restoration Program,
established in 1984 to "promote and coordinate efforts for
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the evaluation and cleanup of contamination at Department of
Defense (DoD) installations."' DERP consists of two main
components, the Installation Restoration (IR) Program for
investigating and cleaning up hazardous waste sites, and the
Other Hazardous Waste (OHW) Operations Program for reducing
the production of hazardous wastes through research,
development and implementation of generation reduction
programs." DoD has made strides in the OHW program and
views it as a preventative measure to keep from creating
more contaminated sites for future generations.
Nevertheless, the lion's share of the DERP appropriation
each year is spent on the IR portion of DERP.
2.3.2 The Installation Restoration (IR) Program
Each individual service (Army, Air Force, and
Navy/Marine Corps) has its own Installation Restoration
Program for investigating and cleaning up its own
contaminated sites. IR addresses past (not on-going)
activities, and considers all potential hazardous waste
sites on DoD installations in the U. S. and its territorial
possessions. (Installations on foreign soils are subject to
the relevant Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA) and are not
subject to the IR Program requirements.') One key
difference for DoD is that DERP/IR apply to all potential
7DERP Annual Report, p. 1.
"Ibid., p. 1.
"Navy/Marine Corps IR Manual, p. x.
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contamination sites on DoD property, while for the civilian
communities CERCLA/SARA only apply to sites on the NPL.
DoD prioritizes its IR activities on a "worst-first"
basis and thus concentrates its most intense investigation
and cleanup activities on the removal of imminent threats
from hazardous substances or unexploded ordnance, on
stabilization measures to prevent site deterioration and
achieve overall site cleanup savings, and on RI/FSs at sites
either listed or proposed for the NPL and RD/RAs necessary
to comply with SARA.x10
At those "worst" sites that have made the NPL, EPA must
approve the cleanup plans for the sites. All others must be
approved by the host state in which the DoD installation is
located. * Note, however, that as a balancing measure
CERCLA Section 120 requires that in order for the state laws
to apply to the Federal facility the state laws:
- must be consistent with CERCLA and must include
a comprehensive scheme for remedial enforcement
- must use health-based standards based on ARARs
- must include cost effectiveness as an element
- and must be free of discriminatory application
to Federal facilities. 1 2
1oDERP Annual Report, p.3.
11Marc Zolton. "Toxic Waste: Poison in the Navy's
Backyard." Navy Times. 41st Year, No. 15, January 20, 1992, p.
12.
12Navy/Marine Corps IR Manual, pp. 1-8.
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2.3.3 Federal Facility Agreements (FFAs)
Because EPA and DoD are both executive branch agencies,
SARA provides measures to ensure that both parties fulfill
their obligations and that the public's interest is served.
Federal Facility Agreements (FFAs) involving DoD, EPA, and
the state agencies satisfy the requirements under SARA that
federal facilities must comply with SARA, must have
interagency agreement on the cleanup action selected, and
must demonstrate to Congress and the public that progress is
being made. FFAs must include the alternatives that could
be taken, the action selected, the schedule for completion
of each cleanup action, and long-term operation and
maintenance plans for the sites. The final FFA is a legal
document which binds the parties to their deadlines and
which allows assessment of monetary penalties for failure to
comply or meet deadlines. The real goal is to enhance
coordination between the various players and jurisdictions
and to provide a framework for resolution of conflicts so
that the sites might be cleaned up quickly and
effectively. 3 To ensure that the FFAs accomplish these
goals, the Navy has established a policy that they will
enter into the agreements only if "the provisions are
realistically attainable and structured to avoid excessive
reporting, duplication of effort, and other administrative
-
3William Judkins. "Federal Facility Agreements at Naval
Installations." Navy Civil Engineer. Vol. XXX, Issue 1, Spring
1991, pp. 10-11.
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practices that reduce the efficiency of the overall remedial
response."1 4 In the end, FFAs ensure that the main
parties who have different frames of reference (EPA =
CERCLA/SARA; DoD = DERP/IR; states = state environmental
laws) meet and agree to common goals.
2.3.4 DERP Summary
Although the DoD environmental restoration process,
much like the Superfund cleanup process, has been subject to
criticism from all corners, "[t]he Congress continues to
provide strong support for the Installation Restoration
Program via the Defense Environmental Restoration
Account."'' With the number of cleanups that DoD faces
and with mounting public pressure for action, one can expect
this Congressional support to continue.
The bottom line is that the job has to get done.
2.4 Scope of the DoD Cleanup Challenge
DoD is somewhat fortunate in that its hazardous waste
cleanup problems are only a part of a bigger national
problem; therefore, the military is not trying to solve
these dilemmas in a vacuum. Figure 2.3 gives an overview of
the cleanups that the U. S. must eventually address.
The military's peacetime and wartime operations over
14Navy/Marine Corps IR Manual, p. 5-1.
15David E. Bottorff, Rear Admiral, CEC, USN. "Navy
Engineering in Action." The Military Engineer. Vol.84, No. 547,
January/February 1992, p. 32.
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Hazardous Waste Site Clean-up Market
Figure 2.3 - The National Cleanup Challenge
(From Kovalick, p. 6)
the past decades have taken their toll on the environment.
Before environmental awareness was a national concern or
anyone ever dreamed of "CERCLA," the military routinely
disposed of their hazardous materials in base landfills or
directly into the environment, dumped tons of unused
aviation fuel before landing their aircraft, and regularly
trained their firefighting crews by burning aircraft and
vehicles on the ground and letting the fuel and firefighting
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1,200 - 2,000 Superfund Sites
4,700 RCRA facilities with 60,000 units
28,000 State non-Superfund Sites
660,000 site with 1.8 million undergound storage tanks (90% petroleum)
638 DoD installations with 7,400 sites
76 DoE facilities with up to 1,500 contaminated areas/facility
liquids spill out to the surrounding areas. 15 These were
not activities carried out under the cloak of national
secrecy; rather, these practices of the military, just like
those polluting activities of their counterparts on the
civilian side of the fence, were the normal activities of
the day. As the citizens of the United States as a whole
have recognized the folly of their actions and begun to
correct them, the military has reflected this national
priority and also begun to tackle its problems.
2.4.1 Number and Types of Sites
As of the end of FY90, DoD had identified 17,482
total IR sites on 1855 installations, but 6361 required no
further action. Table 2.1 summarizes the service component
figures.
Table 2.1 - Installation Restoration Program
Summary of Installations and Sites
Service Number of Number of Sites Requiring
Installations Sites No Further Action
Army 1,266 10,459 5,036
Navy 242 2,253 775
Air Force 315 4,513 448
DLA 32 257 102
Total 1,855 17,482 6,361
Source: DERP Annual Report Congress"
Of those 17,000-plus sites, 95 were on NPL as of the
'*Zolton, p. 11.
31 DERP Annual Report, p. 6.
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end of 1990.1 a In terms of pending base closures, 69
total installations have been slated to be closed by 1996,
15 of which have sites on the Superfund list. 1  One can
imagine that it will take decades to complete all of these
sites.
The types of sites to be cleaned run the gamut from
small leaking underground fuel tanks to highly contaminated
areas near storage areas for obsolete weapons and
machinery.2 0
Each branch of the military has its own
characteristic environmental quagmires: The Army
has horribly polluted ammunition plants; the Air
Force continues to struggle with the devastating
consequences of its historically indiscriminate
use of solvents; and the Navy remains mired in
environmental problems from, among other things,
its careless disposal of paints and paint
strippers into the ground at shipyards and into
the nation's coastal waters.21
2.4.2 Potential Dollar Value
The guess-timates of the money needed to fix just the
DoD's problems vary widely and are subject to just as much
debate as similar figures for the estimated final costs of
the Superfund efforts. A DoD IG report on the military's
17,000-plus sites estimates the cleanup cost between $100-
1sZolton, pp. 10-11.
-"'Pentagon Update: Base Cleanups." The Military Engineer.
Vol.84, No. 547, January/February 1992, p. 23.
2 oZolton, p. 10.
21 Seth Shulman. "Toxic Time Bomb." The Boston Globe
Magazine. Sunday, April 5, 1992, p. 23.
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200 billion.==2 2  (To put this in perspective, however,
"[t]he estimated cost of cleaning up military bases is about
one-tenth that of similar efforts at Department of Energy
installations."2 3 ) In current terms, DoD is moving from
the study phase to cleanup steps on many projects. DoD will
spend about $1.1 billion in FY92 and estimates it will spend
about $1.3 billion next year on environmental cleanups.*2 4
Some argue that this "strong support" from Congress,
representing only about 0.4% of the total DoD budget, is
inadequate. The National Toxic Campaign Fund, a Boston-
based environmental group, is quoted in a January 1991
report on the military's cleanup efforts:
The failure to provide adequate funds is by far
the greatest obstacle to the timely, proper
cleanup of military hazardous wastes...Funding by
itself will not solve the myriad of Pentagon
contamination problems, but without it the Defense
Environmental Restoration Program cannot even
approach its stated goals."2 5
Despite this criticism, the services press on. About one of
every six dollars spent at domestic Navy bases for FY91 was
for environmental related projects. 2"6
2 2Zolton, p. 10.
2 3
="Pentagon Update...", p. 23.
2 4 Ibid., p. 23.
2 5 Zolton, p. 12.
2OKeith Schneider. "Military's New Strategic Goal is
Cleanup of Vast Toxic Waste." The New York Times. Monday,
August 5, 1991, p. D3.
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2.4.3 Status of the IR Program
PA/SIs are either underway or complete at nearly every
DoD installation. Table 2.2 provides a snapshot of DoD's
progress in IR.
Table 2.2 - DoD Environmental Restoration Program
IRP Status Summary as of 30 Sep 1990
Phase Number of Sites
Completed Underway In Future No Further
Action
Required
PA 16,776 658 48 5,000
SI 9,625 1,263 935 1,111
RI/FS 916 4,511 1,540 250
RD 261 1,066 2,559
RA 296 1,191 2,572
Source: ER Annual eportoongress
Obviously, there is a slug of remedial designs and actions
coming down the pipeline. The Navy alone has some 1000
sites under investigation, and is currently working on or
has completed over 150 sites. =a
With the large number of sites expected to
simultaneously reach the costly cleanup phase, and knowing
that funds made available for IR activities by the annual
Defense Appropriations Act are limited, DoD has developed
the Defense Priority Model (DPM) to help refine the
priorities for IR moneys. The DPM uses RI data to provide a
relative risk scoring based on the contaminant hazard, the
2 7DERP Annual Report, p. C-101.
2
"Bottorff, p. 32.
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pathways, and the potential receptors. The model has been
automated and refined in the past few years based on input
from the EPA, the states, environmental organizations and
the public.2'
2.5 Chapter Summary
Both the nation as a whole and DoD in particular have
aggressive environmental restoration programs to cleanup
hazardous waste sites. With the large amounts of taxpayer
money being used to execute these programs, it is wise to
understand the structure of these programs and to analyze
the contracting process that will serve as the interface
between those who want a cleanup done and those who will get
paid to do it.
29DERP Annual Report, pp. 1 & 3.
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3DOD ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION CONTRACTING
3.1 General
Concern for the quality of the environment has
brought about fundamental and far reaching changes
in the construction markets. Enormous investments
are being made to build treatment facilities and
for hazardous waste site clean-up.30
With all the environmental restoration work needed by
DoD, it is important to take a look at how that work is
done. Chapter 3 analyzes the current DoD environmental
restoration contracting process by examining the nature of
the work, the market which executes the work, and the
particular ways in which risk is allocated and contracts are
implemented. This chapter also gives some of the advantages
and disadvantages of the existing methods and sets the stage
for a comparison to other contracting methods in DoD.
3.2 Analysis of the Nature of Restoration Work
Environmental restoration work is much like traditional
construction work in that it has an owner who wants
something done, a designer who provides a map of how to meet
the owners needs, and a contractor who executes the
3oRavi Jain. Opportunities and Challenges Related to the
Environment: A Government Perspective. Speech delivered at the
Symposium on Global Environment and the Construction Industry,
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts,
October 22, 1991, p. 16.
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designer's plan; contractual agreements between the various
parties to define duties and liabilities and to state the
compensation for providing those services; a body of laws,
regulations and traditions (outside of the defined
contracts) which also controls the process; and a finished
product which rarely fulfills 100% of the owner's original
expectations.
Even the steps in the remedial action process (as
described in Section 2.2.1) parallel the building
construction process. The owner begins with a study (the
Preliminary Assessment/Site Investigation and the Remedial
Investigation/Feasibility Study), commits to a design (the
Remedial Design) and then has the design constructed (the
Remedial Action). It is easy to understand why traditional
construction contracting methods might be used by an owner
who feels comfortable with those procedures and who does not
consider environmental work to be any different than other
building projects for which he has contracted in the past.
However, there are a number of characteristics of
environmental restoration work that distinguish it from a
mundane construction project. For example, environmental
work is unlike traditional construction in that the desired
result or performance level is known, but how to get there
is often up for grabs because many alternatives could
provide that same result. With a traditional constructed
facility, there are a very limited number of construction
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methods that will result in the exact facility called for in
the plans and specifications.
Another difference is that each remediation project is
a "one-off" design and construction effort, with no "off-
the-shelf" answers available; rarely will one find two
remediation projects so similar that one might be able to
duplicate major portions of the design. The particular
cleanup levels for a site are determined by site specific
risk assessments 3l which are based on the particular
sources of contamination, the specific potential receptors
of that contamination, the expected routes of exposure
between the two, and the acceptable level of exposure to the
contaminant should it occur. Although one might argue that
every building is unique as to its location, design, etc.,
building types and facility designs are much more readily
adapted from one project to the next than environmental
designs. Also, restoration work incorporates a wide variety
of skills that aren't usually found in one firm, such as
hydrogeology, biology, construction management, regulatory
expertise, industrial hygiene, chemical engineering and so
on. 32
3
"Walter W. Kovalick. Innovative Site Remediation
Technologies: Barriers and Opportunities. Speech delivered at
the Symposium on Global Environment and the Construction
Industry, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Cambridge,
Massachusetts, October 21, 1991, p. 3.
32 Donald T. Goldberg. Market Trends in Environmental.
Presentation at the Symposium on The Construction Industry in the
Northeast: Opportunities for the 21st Century, Massachusetts
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Another difference between environmental construction
and traditional construction is that ALL environmental jobs
are high cost efforts, easily in the millions. Under
Superfund, the remediation costs have averaged between $20-
30 million.' 3 There are certainly some facility projects
that well exceed this cost, but the average building
construction cost for a facility erected using traditional
contracting methods (especially in the DoD sector) is much
lower.
The high potential for change in an environmental
restoration project makes it stand out from typical
construction. Because almost all contaminants of concern in
a restoration project are underground, there is a high
degree of uncertainty about the quantity of and location of
contamination. At the same time, the contaminants are
usually mobile (albeit a slow movement) so one who is trying
to scope, design and construct a restoration job is trying
to hit a moving target. Many routine construction jobs face
major changes as they develop, but in most cases the major
decisions about the construction are known well before the
design and construction commence. The potential for change
does exist in standard construction, but that potential is
far greater in environmental work.
Finally, the biggest difference between environmental
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, May 13, 1992.
"
3 Hoffman, The Hazardous..., p. 44.
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construction and traditional building construction is in the
area of liability. Both types of projects involve
liabilities for the adequacy of design, for accidents during
construction, for damages to third parties, and so on, but
(as will be pointed out in more detail in Section 3.5) the
liabilities for performing environmental restoration work
are almost mind boggling when compared to a routine
construction project.
In summary, there are several key differences between
environmental projects and typical building projects.
Although some of these unusual traits are found in facility
construction situations, when those unusual situations are
present in a building project they often lead the owner to
treat the project differently from his other projects.
Either way, the argument can be made that environmental
restoration work is much different than an ordinary building
project and thus by its very nature should not be handled in
a "business as usual" manner.
3.3 Overview of the Players in the Market
The environmental restoration market as a whole is
growing rapidly, so the military should benefit in that it
is not trying to solve an internal problem but is part of a
bigger picture. Other organizations, especially EPA, DoE,
the states and private companies, are all contracting for
remediation or other environmental related services on a
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more frequent basis. The players who make up the main
contractors in this market come from a variety of origins.
3.3.1 Existing Environmental Companies
Solid waste disposal firms were the early and obvious
entrants to the environmental market as it emerged.
Environmental consultants who traditionally have the skills
necessary to study soil and groundwater have also captured
part of the market. Some of these "green" consultants have
also begun offering cleanup services to their customers. 34
3.3.2 Defense Industry Firms
One of the more recent entrants to the market is the
defense industry. With the downsizing of the U. S.
military-industrial complex, these defense contractors are
making less military hardware. "Spending on military-
environmental projects is causing private companies, some of
them among the largest contractors for the military
industry, to establish new divisions to compete for
government contracts, many of them worth $100 million to $1
billion. ,,3
3.3.3 Construction Contractors
Considering the nature of the field work in
environmental cleanups and the contracting techniques often
used to obtain these efforts, traditional construction
contractors are becoming more interested in the
-39-
3 4Ibid., pp. 40-42.
3 Schneider, p. D3.
environmental arena because they see it as a natural fit
with the rest of their business. "Waste remediation may be
a solid shot in the arm for construction firms who have been
hit hard by the current recession and it offers to provide
substantial payoffs for years to come.' 36 Among those
constructors that have done well are those whose original
business was environmentally related, such as in waste and
wastewater facility construction. Others have vertically
integrated or established strategic alliances with other
firms having the skills they need to offer a complete
package of services.' 7
One should not assume, however, that just any
construction firm can jump right in to the environmental
ring and be successful. "Although the project management
and construction/earth moving skills that construction
companies possess are precisely the skills necessary for the
action phases of remediation, waste remediation is
completely unfamiliar territory for contractors.""
The unfamiliarity with the interdisciplinary and
complex world of environmental restoration has been
characteristic of all the major players in the market. As a
"'Andrew Hoffman. "Strategic Alliances for the Hazardous
Waste Remediation Market." Construction Business Review. Vol.
x, No. x, January/February 1992, p. 56.
'37 Ibid., pp. 59-61.
8
"Ibid., p. 57.
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result, there have been a number of growing pains in
Superfund, DERP/IR and other remedial action programs:
As has been discovered over time, Superfund
cleanups often require special expertise that was
not and is still not readily available in the
private sector. For instance, large numbers of
inexperienced civil engineers, geologists and
hydrogeologists have no expertise or experience
with toxic chemicals...To a large extent, the
billions of dollars rapidly spent on Superfund
have provided an opportunity for many contractors
to start new businesses and to learn the business
of toxic waste cleanup. To some extent this was
inevitable and has precedents in other fields.
The point here is that the rapid increase in
spending on contractors was based on incorrect
assumptions and that the efficiency of the program
has suffered as a result. 39
Even among the industries listed above, there are a
number of firms who are NOT playing because of the current
climate. Those companies which fear strict liability
judgements from environmental related work (no proof of
cause and effect between an event and the subsequent
damages, yet the award is still made), those who fear
unlimited and unspecified future claims by allegedly damaged
parties, and those corporations which do not want to test
the theory of the 'corporate veil' on their particular
institution have shied away from the environmental
market. 40  As succinctly stated by James Janis, chairman
of the Hazardous Waste Action Coalition (HWAC) Federal
3'U. S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment.
Assessing Contractor Use in Superfund: A Background Paper of
OTA's Assessment on Superfund Implementation. Washington, D. C.:
U. S. Government Printing Office, January 1989, p. 40.
4oHoffman, The Hazardous..., pp. 60-65.
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Action Committee, in his testimony to the Environmental
Restoration Panel of the House Armed Services Committee,
"Without a reliable system in place to share
third-party liability risk equitably with the
government, our members tell us that entering into
a DoD cleanup contract becomes a virtual 'bet the
company' situation." 4'-
Still others in the private sector who, for example, do not
want to deal with government bureaucracy or do not want to
wait out the permitting process for a hazardous waste
remediation facility also steer clear. 42
Nevertheless, with the large amounts of cash just
waiting to be had, the competition between the environmental
"greenies," the defense industry and the construction
industry will remain intense.
3.4 Overview of the DoD Remediation Contracting Process
In trying to restore a hazardous waste site to a safe
condition, DoD has to balance a number of often conflicting
factors. On the one hand, there is the need for quick,
effective and high quality action to protect the public and
the environment. On the other, the Federal Acquisition
Regulations (FAR) which dictate how the government contracts
for goods and services call for full and open competition in
the procurement process, demand sealed bid procedures in
4 Sally Keene. "Washington Update - HWAC Testifies on DoD
Contracting Terms." The Military Engineer. Vol. 84, No. 549,
May-June 1992, p. 27.
42Kovalick, p. 3.
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almost every circumstance and generally restrict how DoD can
enter into contracts.4 3 Intertwined with all of these
elements is a limited pool of manpower and financial
resources trying to put it all together. In this atmosphere
of conflicting demands, DoD has come up with a relatively
effective way to complete an environmental restoration
project.
Although throughout the decentralized DoD there are
countless variations on how each service and local office
contracts for environmental restoration services, the
general scheme is as follows. 44 DoD typically awards, by
negotiation, a cost-plus-award-fee contract to an
environmental consultant to conduct the Preliminary
Assessment and Site Investigation (the award portion is
based on the contractor's cost efficiency, schedule and
quality). If conditions dictate that the remediation
process continue, the same engineering consultant is
retained to conduct the Remedial Investigation, the
Feasibility Study and to write the Record of Decision. (In
the early years of hazardous waste site remediation, DoD
often hired multiple consultants to conduct various steps up
to the point of the ROD. However, the lack of continuity in
the work and the inefficiencies of having to reclimb the
learning curve with each new consultant has led DoD to
4 3See FAR 6.1, 36.103 and 36.209, for example.
4 4Summary of Interviews with Wironen, Harber and Hicks.
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follow private sector practices and hire one consultant for
all the study phases). The firm which studies the site is
normally a well established environmental consulting firm
which has been hired on its merits (not on its price
proposal) using Brooks Act procedures. For the Navy, these
contracts are usually awarded and administered at the
engineering field division (regional) level, not at the
local installation level. Once the Record of Decision is
published by the EPA, DoD will hire an engineering firm to
perform the remedial design for the site. In most cases,
the firm which performed the first part of the study
continues with the RD; in other cases a separate company
does the design. In either case, this contract is also a
cost-plus-award-fee negotiated contract managed, in the case
of the Navy, at the EFD level. The engineering firm doing
the RD is paid to produce a set of biddable plans and
specifications, a construction cost estimate, a draft
Operations and Maintenance Plan, a draft Monitoring Plan,
and a final Quality Assurance Program Plan. Figure 3.1
illustrates the RD steps.
The plans and specifications are then advertised by DoD
through an Invitation for Bid, and award of the remedial
action contract (the "construction" contract) is made to the
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Figure 3.1 - The Remedial Design Step
(From the Navy/Marine Corps IR Manual)
lowest responsive, responsible bidder. The remedial action
contract is administered by the local DoD construction
contracting office for the activity on which the hazardous
waste site is located. Figure 3.2 shows the elements in
this step of the process.
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ELEMENTS OF THE REMEDIAL DESIGN STEP
-------------.*.......... -- - *J ;. .. ............
SELECTION OF REMEDIAL p REMEDIAL
REMEDY DESIGN ACTION
......................... . ................... +
Purposes *. Preoate Scooe of Work. soeciflcatlonas, and DiOld ocuments
* Select Remedial Action contractor
* Prepare RO/RA Work Plan
Potentital * Remedial Action
Subsequent
Actions
Tasks
Preaward * Preoare Scooe of Work. soecilfications, and Did documents
ActivitIes (EF0)
* Advertise (EF0)
* Evaluate Oids (EFO)
* Select contractor (EFO)
* Award contract(s) (EFO)
Post Award * Monitor contractor's effort (EF0)
ActivitIes * Revise Community Relations Plan (CRP), as
necessary (Installation)
* Conduct pilot scale testing, as necessary
Documentation * Revised CRP (installation)
* ScoosPe of Work, s3eCIflcatlons, and Did documents (EFO)
* RO/RA Workmlan
* Remedial Design Fact Sheet
Additional Site
Management
Activities
LIEGENO
EPA/State
Activities 
l M:anot,
lCoinlc ent Ste
Stoat
Figure 3.2 - The Remedial Action Step
(From the Navy/Marine Corps IR Manual)
In essence, DoD is using traditional building
construction contracting procedures to execute its
environmental restoration work. "[T]he idea of making field
decisions, which would be useful in considering that no two
hazardous wastes sites are the same, is dismissed because
field decisions do not lend themselves to detailed
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ELEMENTS OF THE REMEDIAL ACTION STEP
......................... , ••
REMEDIAL .__. REMEDIAL POST-PROJECT
DESIGN ACTION ............. I
ACTIVITIES
Purposes * Install remedial technologies
* Imolement land use controls
* Program for Post-*roiect activities
Potential * Post-oroject Activities
Subsequent * Long Term Monitoring
Actions * No Further Action
Tasks * Field activity management [installation and EFO)
* ImDlement land use restrictions (Installation)
Documentation * Worker Health and Safety Plan
* Sampling and AnalysiS Plan for POSt-oroject Activities
* Contractor documentation of work Derformed. equioment
installed, site worker, and visitor logs; comDliance with
Worker Health and Safety Plan: and comoliance with Data
Quality Objectives
* 'As-Ouilt' drawings (EF0)
* O&M Manual for electro-mechanical equidment (EFO)
Additional Site * Program O&M resources for Dost-Oroject activities
Management (Installatlon)
Activities
EPA/State
Aolivtives LEsENO
O9ttOnalt or
•" " Contingent 3tao
Int aerOe acen t
.Soo$
documentation" which is required in a litigious and highly
regulatory environment. 4 5 In addition, this method is
being forced upon a group of players who have varying levels
of expertise. You have:
- the traditional environmental "greenies," who
understand the nature of environmental work very well, but
who may not be very familiar with the construction
contracting methods;
- the construction companies, some of whom know
DoD construction rules inside-out but who may not be very
experienced in environmental restoration; and
- the defense contractors, who in many cases are
probably not familiar with either the type of work or the
construction contracting methods.
The Navy somewhat recognizes this inconsistency in
using building construction procedures to contract for
environmental projects. In the Navy/Marine Corps
Installation Restoration Manual, they point out:
"The field implementation of remedial action project
designs differs from standard facility construction designs.
While a "facility" will not usually be the end product of
remedial action work, the work effort uses construction
methods to accomplish the goal." 45 (emphasis added)
As will be highlighted in Section 3.6, the existing
4 ODan Morse. "What's Wrong with Superfund?" Civil
Engineering. Vol. 59, No. 4, April 1989, pp. 41-42.
4ORemedial Action Management Guide for Resident Officer in
Charge of Construction (DRAFT, Version 2.0). Port Hueneme,
California: Naval Energy and Environmental Support Activity,
November 1991, p. 1-1.
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contracting methods serve their purpose, but there are a
number of weaknesses in the system which could be shored up.
3.5 Risk Allocation in the Current Contracting Process
Risk is most often viewed as "the likelihood of
something bad happening." From a contracting standpoint,
risk is better defined as "uncertainty." The more doubt
about the future of some event (i.e., the variability of
possible outcomes), the higher the risk. 47
"The decision by an owner of what type of contract to
use should revolve around risk allocation." 48  A properly
conceived contract package allocates the various risks to
the party which has the best ability to manage each risk,
compensates that party for assuming that risk, and provides
incentives for each party to properly manage the risks which
they have been assigned. Thus when one is putting together
an contract acquisition package, one should assess the
risks, properly allocate them, and fairly compensate the
assigned party.4'
47Richard A. Brealey and Stewart C. Myers. Principles of
Corporate Finance. New York, New York: McGraw-Hill, Inc., 1991
pp. 132-139.
4
"Christopher M. Gordon. Compatibility of Construction
Contracting Methods with Projects and Owners. Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Thesis submitted to the Department of Civil
Engineering, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, September,
1991, p. 112.
4
"Carl R. Beidleman, Donna Fletcher, and David Veshosky.
"On Allocating Risk: The Essence of Project Finance." Sloan
Management Review. Spring 1990, pp. 47-51.
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3.5.1 Assessing the Risks
One convenient way to organize the risks is by when
they occur in the remediation process. Some risks are
present throughout the restoration process, others are
predominant in only one step, and still others are
questionable as to when they occur. This section lists and
briefly describes the significant risks during each
restoration phase. A discussion on the allocation of risks
follows in Section 3.5.2.
Study Phases (PA/SI and RI/FS)
- Scope of work: quantity and location of contaminants,
amount of sampling which will be required, manpower required
to do the studies, etc. (this is a risk because of the
unpredictable nature of environmental work)
- Performance of the environmental consultant: quality
and timeliness of his work
- Performance of various remediation technologies: the
FS encompasses an analysis of alternatives and choices about
the technologies; both the decision maker and the technology
itself are at risk
Design Phase (RD)
- Scope of work: amount of design effort required,
additional sampling necessary to complete the design, and
areas to be incorporated into the design; all depend
somewhat on the study phases
- Performance of the designer: quality and timeliness
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of his work, adequacy of the design in terms of reaching the
cleanup standard dictated by the ROD, completeness of the
design in terms of capturing all conditions at the site and
incorporating those conditions into the plans and
specifications, and the associated latent liabilities for
failing to perform in these areas
- Performance of the remediation technology
application: the ROD may select 'incineration' but the
designer must choose which incinerator, how high the
temperatures must be, throughput, etc.; also carries the
associated latent liability for failure of the application
to perform
Implementation Phase (RA)
- Scope of Work: quantity and location of contaminants
to be treated, other conditions at the site which the
contractor will encounter
- Performance of the remedial action contractor:
production rate of the labor force; actual material, labor
and overhead expense costs incurred; quality and timeliness
of work
- Safe execution of the work: protection of the site
and surrounding areas from accidental releases during
remediation; protection of the workers at the site
- Completion of the contract: financial stability and
technical capability of the RA contractor
- Performance of the technology: RA contractor may be
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blamed for his performance when in fact the technology is
failing
3.5.2 Allocation and Compensation
As stated earlier, an efficient contracting process
allocates risk to the party that is best able to manage the
risk and compensates that party in proportion to the risk.
The risks listed in Section 3.5.1 are analyzed below in the
following format:
" - Risk: who is best able to bear that risk (and why);
who bears that risk in the current DoD environmental
restoration contracting process."
Recommendations for improvements to the process in
general and risk allocation in particular are reserved for
Chapter 5.
Study Phases (PA/SI and RI/FS)
- Scope of work: DoD, because they have caused the
problem which has generated the need for restoration work to
begin with and because they dictate what they want done by
the contractor; DoD, because of the cost-plus nature of the
study contracts
- Performance of the environmental consultant: the
consultant, because he has direct control over his
personnel, the resources he commits to the task, the level
of supervision and review, and so on; the consultant,
because his performance determines the level of award fee he
receives (assuming the award fee panel is unbiased)
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- Performance of various remediation technologies: best
shared between the consultant and DoD, because "the
technology" is an abstract concept that no party can control
while the evaluation/decision making about the technology is
controlled by the consultant; the consultant, because if the
technology fails DoD has no liability and can blame the
contractor's decision making and require him to do more
studying (at his expense) until the problem is resolved,
while it may be difficult for the contractor to prove he is
NOT at fault
Design Phase (RD)
- Scope of work: DoD, same reasoning as above; DoD,
same reasoning as above
- Performance of the designer: the designer, same
reasoning as above; the designer, same reasoning as above
- Performance of the remediation technology
application: best shared between the designer and DoD, same
reasoning as above; the designer, same reasoning as above
Implementation Phase (RA)
- Scope of Work: DoD, same reasoning as above; born
mostly by DoD (because of the "Changes" and "Unforeseen
Conditions" clauses included in DoD contracts), but shared
somewhat by the designer, in that DoD can occasionally
recoup from the designer if the plans and specs were faulty
(and DoD didn't hamper the designer by its budget or actions
during the design phase); and by the remedial action
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contractor because changes to the scope of work often result
in increased costs which he is unable to adequately recover
from the government
- Performance of the remedial action contractor: the
remedial action contractor, same reasoning as for other
contracted parties; the'remedial action contractor, by the
nature of the firm fixed-price contract
- Safe execution of the work: best shared between the
contractor, because the contractor has direct control over
the means and methods of construction and the actions of his
workforce, and to a lesser degree DoD, because they caused
the hazard in the first place and because it is often
difficult to determine whether damages to a third party were
caused by the original contamination or by some action
during the cleanup; the contractor, because DoD assumes no
liability and expects the contractor to be insured. The
whole issue of liability is a major problem as discussed at
the end of Section 3.3, but for now
CERCLA allows the government to indemnify remedial
action contractors. Presently, the Department of
Defense (DoD) does NOT indemnify remedial action
contractors while the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) does.'0 (emphasis in the original).
- Completion of the contract: the contractor, because
he has control over his firm and its backing; either the
contractor, if he is bonded, or DoD, if the contractor is
unbonded. There are a number of restoration contractors who
"oRemedial Action..., p. 5-10.
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simply can't get or maintain bonding for environmental
work.5*
- Performance of the technology: DoD and the designer
at this phase, because their actions led to the technology
that is called for in the plans and specifications; the
designer, because a technology failure can easily be termed
a design failure as described earlier, and the RA contractor
to a lesser extent because he might be held accountable for
poor performance when in fact the technology is faulty and
he cannot prove it to the government's satisfaction.
One of the key aspects of risk which permeates all
three phases delineated above but which is muddled under the
current process is the issue of liability. There is a
distinct difference between liability stemming from third
party accusations versus liability for performance of the
engineering, technology, or construction means and methods.
The first is really external to the process and to the
contracts between DoD and the various firms, while the
latter is internal to the process but more readily
controlled. Most engineers/constructors are willing to take
accountability for their own actions but are very leery
about facing huge third party claims, perhaps even years
after they've walked away from a successful restoration
5"Hoffman, The Hazardous..., p. 63.
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project. 52  DoD should begin to take a more active role in
assuming some of the liabilities if it wants to help keep
the contracting community solvent.
In summary, the current methods seem to allocate risk
properly in most areas, but not so in the areas of
technology performance and liability.
3.6 Advantages and Disadvantages of the Current DoD Process
As mentioned earlier, the existing methods have worked
reasonably well to date and there are times when they are
appropriate. However, this "traditional" building
construction process of design-bid-build brings certain
advantages and disadvantages when applied to the
environmental contracting process.
3.6.1 Advantages
From DoD's perspective as the owner, some of the
advantages of the traditional method are:
- the contractor(s) for the highly technical
engineering phase(s) is/are selected based on their
qualifications, not their price proposal
- the independent design professional is available
during the construction phase to advise DoD
- full and free competition for the remedial
action or "construction" phase
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5 2 Ibid., pp. 58-60.
- an objective evaluation criteria for the
remedial action contractor (price) that is not subject to
fraud or abuse, along with the resulting public perception
of incorruptibility of the process
- application of market forces to the process
3.6.2 Disadvantages
Some of the drawbacks of the existing procedures are:
- it is bureaucratic, time intensive, difficult to
manage and expensive. "The Office of Technology Assessment
(OTA) reports that it is not uncommon for the government to
spend from 100%-500% more than a private client for the same
study or cleanup."''
- by having the remedial action contractor commit
to a firm fixed-price bid, adversarial relationships develop
and teamwork between the owner, the designer and the
constructor is hampered.
- with no prequalifications of remedial action
contractors, contractors of questionable ability may be
awarded work that is beyond their capabilities. In the DoD
sector, it is extremely difficult to prove (prior to
contract award) that a contractor is not capable of
performing the work.
- there is a high potential for changed conditions
53Michael A. Rossi. The Department of Defense and the
Construction Industry: Leadership Opportunities in Hazardous
Waste Remediation Innovation. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Thesis
submitted to the Department of Civil Engineering, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, January, 1992, p. 15.
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during construction, because the design is at 100% when
advertised but by its very nature environmental work is
constantly changing and hard to define prior to the
commencement of remedial action.
- the remedial action contractor does not
guarantee that the design will work or will achieve the
desired results, only that he will construct whatever is
shown,in the bid documents. This can also lead to finger-
pointing between the designer and the constructor if
something fails to work.
- the remedial action contractor is brought in
late in the acquisition process, which leads to a lack of
innovation in available solutions. "A common complaint
about bidding is that it stifles innovation and research in
the industry because contractors cannot afford to invest in
it, and are not rewarded for innovation unless it results in
immediate cost savings."' 4
- technology innovation is stifled because the
contractors must bear the risk of the technology itself
rather than their performance of that technology
- there is no incentive for superior performance
because there is no way to recognize the outstanding
contractors (such as with the promise of repeat business).
A good remedial action contractor has to compete for the
next award just like everyone else.
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"'Gordon, p. 135.
Even though contractors in general are highly
professional and want to do a first rate
environmental job, how well the public interest is
served depends on how well a program is managed by
the government. If the government does not
demand, measure and reward quality contractor work
it will not get it (emphasis added).5 5
The disadvantages listed above show that the
"traditional" process is probably not well suited for all
situations encountered in the installation restoration
process. In this situation where timeliness and quality of
work should be far more important than cost, DoD currently
applies a contracting method which is structured to take a
long time (the designer must have complete confidence in his
study before committing to 100% plans and specs, so he
spends his time accordingly; the bidding process itself
takes additional time; and the expectation of changes during
the construction phase also means an expectation of delays
and work stoppages) and which uses cost as the most
important award criterion for the remedial action contract.
3.7 Chapter Summary
The analysis of the amount of work to be done, the
nature of the work, the players who are standing by to do it
and the potential for improving the existing process shows
there are great opportunities ahead for both DoD and the
contracting community, as well as some obstacles to
overcome. The Army Corps of Engineers and the Navy Civil
55U. S. Congress, OTA, Assessing Contractor Use..., p. 2.
-58-
Engineer Corps have a history of working successfully with
industry to meet the challenges of the nation's defense and
infrastructure, albeit a "love-hate" relationship at times.
These two groups are well situated to take on the next great
mission of environmental cleanup.
As we make the transition from the investigation
of our sites to the more costly cleanup phase, we
must ensure that our efforts are properly focused
to obtain the greatest benefit possible for our
cleanup dollars. Many challenges await us in the
coming years. Although we have come a long way in
the seven years that DERP has existed, we still
have far to go. The course we have charted for
the future is sound and will ensure the
achievement of our environmental restoration
goals.56
56 Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense (Environment)
Thomas Baca in DERP Annual Report, p. v.
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4DOD WEAPONS ACQUISITION CONTRACTING
4.1 General
Before and during World War II, the defense
industry was usually compared with a typical
manufacturing industry, such as the auto industry.
The emphasis was on simplicity, reliability and
producibility. Since the late 1950s, however, the
industry has been compared with a custom design
and development industry, where contracting plays
a major role.57
A "custom design and development industry, where
contracting plays a major role" not only describes the
weapons industry but also rings of the construction industry
and the environmental restoration process. The first part
of this thesis has addressed the unique nature of
environmental work and the methods currently employed to
accomplish that high-risk work. However, when one thinks of
high-tech, high-risk projects, the immediate industries
which come to mind are the defense weapons industry and the
aerospace industry. Since DoD has experience in the
procurement of weapons systems, one can look to that method
for some clues to improve the environmental contracting
methodology. "Despite the significant problems plaguing the
acquisition process, few would challenge the statement that
57J. Ronald Fox. The Defense Management Challenge: Weapons
Acquisition. Boston, Massachusetts: Harvard Business School
Press, 1988, p. 11.
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U. S. defense weapons and equipment are among the best in
the world." e58
This chapter follows a format similar to that of
Chapter 3. The general nature of weapons acquisition is
outlined, the industry and market that are providing that
product/service are discussed, the process by which DoD
accesses these industries is presented (including a
discussion of risk allocation), and then some of the
strengths and weaknesses of the weapons acquisition process
are given. The intent is to provide enough information to
extract some of the key aspects of the procedures without
going into a complete analysis of the weapons acquisition
process.
4.2 Analysis of the Nature of Weapons Development and
Production
When analyzing the nature of weapons system development
and production work (irrespective of the contracting process
used), many of the characteristics that were descriptive of
environmental restoration work apply as well to the weapons
process.
Weapons development is driven by mission and
performance oriented specifications, rather than by
descriptions of a physical product that must result. When
beginning the process to obtain a new weapon system, the
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military services decide what job that system must perform
and to what standards, but they do not initially attempt to
define what type of product will result. This performance
oriented development process generates many opportunities
for creative thinking and innovative ideas.
The next characteristic of the weapons development
process is that it deals with high technology products and
services. In the choice between having a large number of
cheap, low technology weapons complemented by a large
fighting force, or having a fewer number of expensive, high
technology weapons rounded out by a smaller fighting force,
the United States has chosen the latter. Since many of the
weapons programs are so complex and unique, there is little
basis for cost, schedule and performance estimates at the
beginning of the process.
High program costs are another characteristic of the
weapons development process. Depending on the year in
question or the source you read, the estimates of federal
spending for defense research and development and for
weapons production range from $100-140 billion per year.
Considering that the U. S. typically has some 100 to 150
weapons systems in the development and production process at
any given time, the average cost per program is obviously
quite high.
The most important characteristic of weapons
development is that it is highly risky work. As will be
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described in Section 4.5, there is a high degree of both
technological and financial uncertainty. Since the emphasis
of U. S. strategic policy traditionally has been on
technological superiority, "the weapons acquisition process
is defined by the inherent uncertainty that comes with
pressing beyond the existing technological horizon."15 9
There is enormous potential for change throughout the life
of the process, caused by both the nature of the work itself
and the length of the process (seven to twenty years
depending on the program).e0
In summary, as described by Leonard Sullivan, Jr., in
his paper "Characterizing the Acquisition Process,"
Major weapons system development and production
programs are technologically advanced and complex.
Indeed, they are often designed to achieve
performance levels never before realized, using
many components and some materials never before
used in military applications. Production is
characteristically low volume, with the final cost
of a major system frequently running into billions
of dollars. This substantial expenditure of time
and money occurs in an environment of rapidly
evolving technology and unexpected changes in
priorities for individual programs. This
predicament creates an environment of uncertainty
and risk for buyer and seller alike, exacerbated
by the unpredictability of technical performance,
development time, and cost. 1
4.3 Comparison of the Weapons Acquisition Industry
"Thomas L. McNaugher. New Weapons, Old Politics.
Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 1989, p. 3.
6oFox, p. 28-29.
'-Ibid., p. 10.
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Unlike the environmental remediation industry, which is
newly emerging and consists of players with backgrounds from
a number of other businesses and industries, the weapons
development industry (as a whole) is a mature industry.
There are a number of segments, such aircraft production,
shipbuilding and electronics manufacturing, but each segment
is relatively consolidated when compared to the highly
fragmented environmental restoration industry. Since the
1950s, the top 25 defense contractors have consistently
captured more than 45% of the dollars awarded each year,
with the top 100 being awarded more than 60% each year.6 2
Many of these leading aerospace, engine and electronics
firms which dominate the scene have been in existence for
years, and often times have relied almost solely on DoD
weapons contracts for their business. As a result, these
players understand the nature of the DoD procurement process
quite well.
As mentioned earlier, estimates of federal spending for
defense research and development and weapons production
range from $100-140 billion per year. These figures are on
the order of the total predicted environmental spending in
the U. S. over the coming decades. However, defense weapons
spending is expected to shrink as the U. S. military gets
smaller, but environmental spending is on the rise.
The competition for the defense weapons acquisition
62McNaugher, p. 150.
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dollars takes place under somewhat unique circumstances.
Most writers contend that the business of the defense
industry is not a true commercial marketplace. In a
competitive market, the business firm decides what it will
produce, the methods of production, the quantity, the price,
and so on, and then lets the pressures of the commercial
marketplace validate its decisions about minimizing costs
and maximizing profits. In the defense sector, the product
and quantity are determined by governmental authority, price
is normally not an overbearing concern, and competition
normally focuses on the proposed design and its promise of
performance rather than on the product itself and its actual
performance.53  (Hence, the attempts to reform government
procurement and make it 'more business-like' have been
doomed to failure.) "In the absence of market forces, the
big defense firms respond mainly to signals, incentives, and
regulations provided by the government. '6 4
4.4 The DoD Weapons Acquisition Process
The development and production of sophisticated
military hardware is a daunting challenge. Hundreds of DoD
staffers in offices in the Pentagon and in the plants of the
major defense firms must keep track of thousands of design
details, component testing schedules, Congressional
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"Fox, p. 16-17.
O4McNaugher, p.151.
inquiries, contractor change proposals, budgeting
constraints, ad nauseam. To condense the process into a few
short pages oversimplifies what is a truly difficult
management task that few in the public understand. However,
a few generalizations and a survey of the methodology are
sufficient to allow one to gain some insight into this
complex acquisition system.
4.4.1 History"
Prior to World War I, the military departments
developed and produced their required ammunition and
equipment using their own government plants and workers, or
by using rigid contracting procedures. The procurement
bureaucracies "emphasized strict separation of R&D from
production, elaborate test procedures, competitive bidding
for production contracts, and quality control during
production."** The organizations, the methods and the
general mentality were all geared to the manufacturing of
ordnance and equipment by mass production rather than to a
focus on innovation and advancement.
DoD's use of the private sector as the primary agent
for the development of new hardware had its origins in the
1920s. The shift in emphasis was driven mostly by advances
in aviation and aircraft technology. While working to
develop new aircraft engines, the arcane in-house methods
"This section drawn from McNaugher, pp. 17-33.
OgIbid., p. 21.
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employed by the Navy and the Army Air Corps put them
miserably behind commercial industry. The bureaucracies
could not respond to the rapidly changing technological
environment.
The impetus for using the private aircraft industry to
design and develop new aircraft came primarily from
entrepreneurs in the industry. These leaders lobbied
Congress to get the development of military aircraft out of
the government's inflexible system and into the hands of the
experts. Speed and innovation were paramount, and the
military's in-house capability could provide neither.
Congress, being "fascinated not only with aircraft and the
free-wheeling entrepreneurs who built them but also with the
'promise of air power',"' 7 forced the change upon the
services. Since the military's aviation community was still
relatively new at this time and not as entrenched as, say,
the Army Ordnance Bureau, opposition by the services to
these changes was meager.
During the interwar period, this turn to the private
sector became a highly politicized process. Congress,
seeking to ensure competition so that all companies
(especially those in their home districts) had a fair shot
at the American dream, instituted provisions requiring
fixed-price contracts and competition for development
contracts. The services held a competition for each design,
-67-
6
"Ibid., p. 22.
bought the rights for the design, and then advertised the
production contract for competitive bid. With enormously
detailed contracts at each step and intense pressure on
contractors to win low-bid contracts, innovation languished.
In order to get the contract award, developers often under-
bid their design contracts with the hope of making up their
expenses by winning the production bid. However, this
scenario rarely played out because competing contractors
with no invested development costs usually submitted lower
prices for the production contract.
Although the American taxpayer received the immediate
financial benefit of having market forces driving down
prices at every step, several damaging influences were also
being felt. First, designers who lost the production bid
had no incentive to improve their design; at the same time,
winning bidders had no incentive to change the design
because they were constrained by the terms of the contract.
Therefore, the aircraft was stagnant while technology
marched on. The second repercussion of this contracting
situation was that aircraft designers, unable to recoup
their true expenses of developing and experimenting with new
ideas, often either abandoned the process or were driven to
insolvency. Although designed to protect the public's
interest, Congresses actions actually did a disservice to
the industry and to the military research and development
effort.
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During the late 1930s, reforms to the process were
being considered. However, the United States' entry into
World War II put those plans on hold. Production was king
for the war effort.
The final step in the evolution to the current weapons
acquisition process came with the beginnings of the Cold War
and an increased reliance on new technologies in
electronics, radars, and communications systems.
At that point the United States took up the
challenge of accommodating a large, expensive, and
risky technical and military undertaking into a
political system inherently uncomfortable with
what it takes to do a good job of developing
technology.s6
The nature of the hardware had changed again. Instead of
being able to develop and produce individual components and
piecing them together to make a missile or airplane, the
military found that each part was so dependent on the others
that they all had to be developed in concert. The modern
"weapons system" acquisition process was born.
4.4.2 The Current Process
In reality, there are as many particular variations to
the weapons acquisition process as there are weapons
systems, but the overall process is similar. Many
variations and reforms have been instituted in the past 40
years, yet the current weapons acquisition process can still
be categorized into two broad areas: weapons development and
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weapons production. Since production as currently practiced
is primarily a manufacturing effort to produce multiple
physical products, it bears only a slight relation to the
environmental restoration process. Therefore, the focus of
this section will be on the development of weapons and
weapons technology. This process, filled with unique
designs, engineering efforts, and one-of-a-kind results, has
a higher probability of offering some insights applicable to
the challenges of remediation contracting.
Figure 4.1 shows the basic process followed by DoD when
developing a weapon system. A more detailed explanation of
each steps follows.6'
The initial step in the development of a new weapon is
the recognition of a need. If one of the individual
military services (Army, Air Force, Navy, or Marine Corps)
identifies an operational mission which cannot be
accomplished with the existing assets, a requirement is
generated for something new. The service passes this
information to the DoD staff level.
The first hurdle in the process, known as Milestone 0,
is the validation of the operational requirement by DoD. A
joint staff validates the necessity of the requirement and
then determines which service can best meet the mission
need. For example, the Marine Corps may identify a mission
need for some new air defense capability, but it is the
"Developed from Fox, pp. 22-27, and Celotto.
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Figure 4.1 - The Weapons Acquisition Process
Pentagon staff which determines whether that requirement
should be addressed by the Air Force, by naval aviation, by
Army air defense, or by a Marine Corps element. DoD gives
budget authority to the service which is slated to begin the
development process.
Phase 0 of the process is known as concept exploration.
The individual service which has been tasked to explore the
-71-
need develops alternative system design concepts. These
alternatives are initially very broad (an airplane? a
missile? a laser?), and are often generated in consultation
with several of the major defense contractors.
Contractors are willing to undertake these discussions
for two reasons. First, they are at least partially
reimbursed for certain "independent research and development
costs" by a separate charge to other contracts they have
with DoD;70 in effect, each contract with DoD gives them
an opportunity to recoup some of these costs in a pooling
arrangement. Second, the contractors want to participate in
the system design concept discussions because it provides
them an opportunity to get their foot in the door early on
what may eventually blossom into a lucrative development
contract.
By the end of Phase 0, DoD will have established a
general idea as to the type of weapon it wants to pursue and
will set broad cost, schedule and operational thresholds
that must fall within set ranges by Milestone II. In
theory, by this time DoD has identified the key areas of
technical risk that must be reduced by research and
development in the next phase. The service prepares a
system concept paper for the DoD staff, who in turn makes
the Milestone I decision to proceed into the concept
7oWilliam H. Gregory. The Defense Procurement Mess.
Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath & Company, 1989, p. 68.
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demonstration/ validation phase.
Phase I, demonstration and validation, is when the
rubber begins to meet the road. The services and interested
contractors begin exploring detailed technical approaches to
the program and performing analyses of the technical risks.
If funding permits, hardware prototypes are often used to
demonstrate the feasibility of the various alternatives.
Contractors are usually reimbursed on a cost-plus basis for
their efforts during the demonstration phase, provided they
stay within reasonable bounds of the intent of the program.
The results from Phase I are again passed from the
individual service to a joint DoD staff. In order to pass
Milestone II, the program must meet six criteria:72
1. Demonstrable engineering, rather than
experimental, effort.
2. Definition of the mission and performance
requirements.
3. Selection of the best-perceived technical
approaches.
4. A thorough trade-off analysis.
5. Comparison of the cost effectiveness for the
proposed weapon system and competing systems
within DoD, concluding that the proposal is
feasible.
6. Credible and acceptable cost and schedule
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estimates.
Following the Secretary of Defense's authorization to
proceed, and appropriation/allocation of project funding,
the individual service issues a Request for Proposals (RFP).
The RFP gives the managerial, technical and cost criteria
against which the proposals will be evaluated. Although the
RFPs normally request only a moderate amount of information
that will be used to evaluate the offers, the responses are
almost always huge, with "pound upon pound of annexes and
appendices - their thickness measured in feet, not
folios." 72 No one wants to take a chance on leaving
anything out.
Preparing these proposals costs defense firms millions,
but the costs are reimbursed in part as a "bid-and-proposal"
line item charge against other contracts the company may
have with the government (much in the same way as the
independent research and development costs are reimbursed).
The quandary for a contractor is that he is never fully
reimbursed for his efforts. If the government is actively
pursuing a contractor to submit a proposal, the vendor may
not be sure whether the government is doing it because they
expect him to be able to win the award or because they need
to give an appearance of competition before they award to
the contractor that they really want. 73 The contractor
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must weigh the uncertainty of the award against the non-
reimbursed portion of his "bid-and-proposal" expenses.
In the end, the evaluation process becomes increasingly
difficult in direct proportion to the size and complexity of
the proposals, often taking six months or more. The
responsive proposals are evaluated by a panel, which varies
in size and seniority of appointees depending on the value
and complexity of the acquisition. This panel makes a
recommendation to a Pentagon political-level appointee
(often the service secretary himself) who can accept or
reject the source selection panel's choice. 74 The source
selection authority bases his decision on the comparative
evaluations of the proposals, costs, risk assessment, past
performance, contractual considerations, and surveys of
contractor capabilities.'5
The awarding of a contract signals the entry into Phase
II, full-scale development. The system (including all
training devices and support items) is fully developed,
engineered, fabricated and tested at some low rate of
production. The contract for this stage of the process is
either a cost-plus contract or a fixed-price contract,
depending on the particular acquisition. If a weapon is new
and it is also being pushed through the process rapidly, it
is likely to overlap with the earlier and later development
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phases and thus will often be a cost-type contract. Even if
the technology is relatively sure and the contract is fixed-
price, the developer is still likely to negotiate several
hundred changes to the original contract (changes that
either party might initiate). It does not take too many of
these changes before the contract begins to mimic a cost-
type contract.
Provided that Phase II proceeds without too many major
cost overruns, schedule problems, or too much attention from
Congress or the media, the individual service secretary has
the authority to approve entry of the system into full scale
production. This approval is known as Milestone III.
Phase III of the weapons development and production
process is full-scale production and initial deployment.
The contract for this production is often competitively bid
on a fixed-price basis, because by this time most of the
major risks have been identified and contractors are
expected to bear some of those risks. However, if the
program is rushed and full-scale production overlaps with
the development phase, the production contract can be
negotiated on a sole-source basis with the development
contractor.
Of course, by the time a new weapon system reaches
full-scale production, twelve years have passed, the threat
has shifted, and the operational requirement has changed, so
the plans for the updated model begin...
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4.5 Risk Allocation in the Weapons Contracting Process
As mentioned earlier, the key to properly managing the
uncertainty in a contracting situation is to assess the
risks, allocate them to the party best able to manage or
control the uncertainty, and compensate the party
appropriately.
4.5.1 Assessing the Risks
As with Section 3.5.1, one convenient way to organize
the risks is by when they occur in the process. Some risks
are present throughout the acquisition process, others are
predominant in only one step, and still others are
questionable as to when they occur. Some risks, such as
business risk, are present regardless of what business one
is in so those categories are ignored here. This section
lists and briefly describes the significant risks during
each development phase. A discussion on the allocation of
risks follows in Section 4.5.2.
Phase 0
At this stage, the risks are minimal because very
little commitment has been made by either party.
- Financial risks: uncertainty as to whether contractor
can recover the costs of his independent efforts;
uncertainty as to whether the project can be completed
within the given budget.
- Technological risks: uncertainty as to whether the
selected technologies are even appropriate to meet the
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mission need (risk of the decision about the application of
technologies, not the risk of the performance of the
technologies per se); uncertainty as to whether DoD has
identified all the "unknowns" which must be tackled as the
program progresses (the "known unknowns" versus the "unknown
unknowns").
Phase I
The risks increase during the demonstration and
validation phase.
- Scope of work: amount of effort which will be
required of the contractor in order to obtain the level of
information needed for decision-making; number of "unknown
unknowns" which will surface.
- Performance of the contractors: their ability to
achieve what they claim they can in terms of technological
advancement or innovative ideas.
- Financial risks: costs required to perform an
undefinitized level of work on what is often a technology
application that is unproven at this stage; uncertainty as
to the reliability of cost estimates for future phases of
the development based on the work to date; risk of not
recovering all expenses required to prepare the proposal for
Phase II.
- Technology: ability of the particular technology to
function in a field application and at the levels of
performance necessary; risk in the selection of the
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particular technology to pursue in Phase II.
Phase II
At this stage, all major risks are expected to have
been identified and should be more of an engineering nature
than an experimental nature. As will be shown, however,
this is not always the case.
- Scope of work: uncertainty as to the level of effort
required to manufacture a working product; uncertainty as to
what that final product will actually look like and how it
will be manufactured.
- Performance of the developer: ability to meet
schedule and cost estimates; ability to manage the work as
required by contract; ability to identify the source of any
problems which cause cost overruns or delays.
- Financial risks: uncertainty as to whether the actual
costs for items that were foreseen at the time of proposal
preparation fall within estimates; uncertainty in the costs
for any "unknown unknowns" which surface and whether or not
the added costs can be recovered by the contractor.
- Technology: uncertainty in the conversion of the
technology from the prototype/theoretical stage into a fully
engineered application of that technology; uncertainty that
even if the transition is successful that the technology
will perform well enough to meet the mission need.
Phase III
The risks of Phase III usually encompass more typical
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business, market or manufacturing risks than the earlier
developmental phases.
- Scope of work: level of effort required to
manufacture each product.
- Performance of contractor: quality and timeliness of
his work.
- Financial risk: costs to produce each product,
including tooling, labor, etc.
- Technology: performance of the technology in
deployment situations and in the hands of the everyday user
(as opposed to the performance in a test/lab situation at
the hands of a military test specialist or engineer).
4.5.2 Allocation and Compensation
The weapons development and production process has
evolved over the past 40 years to the point where risks seem
to be allocated logically. Although the system does have
flaws in the way it is carried out, the methodology is
appropriately structured to handle uncertainty.
This section examines how the risks identified in
Section 4.5.1 are allocated. Since the financial
compensation in most cases is one way (from the government
to the contractor), the appropriateness of the compensation
is discussed only when the contractor is bearing a risk.
Each risk is listed as written earlier, followed by a
discussion of who appears to be bearing that risk and some
of the important considerations that govern the allocation
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and compensation.
Phase 0
- Financial risks: the uncertainty is shared as to
whether the contractor can recover the costs of his
independent research efforts; he will only be partially
compensated by the "independent research and development"
charge if he has other contracts (which most major firms in
this business do have). Nevertheless, the level of effort
the contractor chooses to devote to this phase is purely
voluntary and under his control, so the compensation appears
fair. The uncertainty as to whether the project can be
completed within the given budget is born by the government,
since they make the decision as to whether or not to proceed
with the program.
- Technological risks: the risk of the appropriateness
of the technologies belongs to the government, since they
choose which avenues to pursue further. The uncertainty as
to whether DoD has identified all the "unknowns" which must
be tackled as the program progresses is also carried by DoD
because they suffer the financial consequences of higher
payments in later stages if they haven't analyzed the
situation correctly. Again, these are tasks under DoD
control so they should carry the risk.
Phase I
- Scope of work: the government bears the risk because
they contract for this work on a cost-plus basis; since the
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government has control over how much work they request and
how much information they need to make their next Milestone
decision, it is appropriate for them to manage this risk.
- Performance of the contractors: born by the
contractors, as it should be. If their performance is
satisfactory, they are compensated for their costs plus
overhead and profit; if they stray too far from the intent
of the program and their agreement with the government, the
government can disallow the recover of the unnecessary
expenses.
- Financial risks: The financial risk of the
undefinitized scope of work is shouldered by the government
with the cost-plus contract. The uncertainty as to the
reliability of the government's cost estimates for future
phases of the development is born by DoD because they suffer
the consequences of inadequate estimates. The risk of not
recovering all expenses required to prepare the proposal for
Phase II is appropriately carried by the contractor, since
he determines how much effort he puts into preparing the
proposal. This risk is carried by any contractor in any
industry which competes for work by bidding or competitive
proposals.
- Technology: again, DoD has control over the decision
and subsequently carries the risk for that decision by the
amount it must pay in later phases.
Phase II
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- Scope of work: since the level of effort required to
transition from experimentation to engineering is so
unpredictable and since DoD determines in the end whether
the developed product is what they want, the government
should and does carry most of this risk through the
contracting arrangement (be it cost-plus or a de facto cost-
plus contract disguised as a 'fixed-price' contract).
- Performance of the developer: because of the
government's ability to disallow reimbursement for certain
costs that are not within the standards of the contract,
this is a risk carried by the contractor. The allocation is
proper because it is the developer who determines his
company's management attention, cost control procedures,
etc., and he has the ability to control whether or not he is
meeting the standards to gain the cost-plus reimbursement.
- Financial risks: as with the scope of work, carried
mostly by the government through the contracting
arrangement. Since the development contractor cannot count
on getting the production contract, he has no way to ensure
he can later recover the developmental costs as part of the
overhead charge on each manufactured product. "His risk,
then, is prohibitive - unless the government agrees to
underwrite the bulk of the costs."76 Thus the government
pays for the developmental cost as it occurs rather than
trying to spread these expenses over the costs of each
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finished product.
- Technology: carried by the government through the
cost-plus (or pseudo-cost-plus) contracts. This is
appropriate, even though some might argue that by this point
in time the contractor should be carrying more risk to
develop his particular weapon technology. The problem is
that the level of effort required at this stage is often
influenced by the government's actions at the previous
stages.
At Milestone II [the decision which allowed the
program to proceed into full-scale development],
all significant risks are expected to have been
resolved, the technology is in hand, and only
engineering (as opposed to experimental) efforts
remain...In practice, paper studies and analyses
often substitute for essential system development
and testing. As a result, uncertainties that
could be eliminated or reduced in the research and
exploratory development phases are often carried
into advanced engineering development or
operational systems development, where unresolved
technical problems are significantly more
expensive and troublesome to correct.77
Therefore, a de facto cost-plus arrangement in the full-
scale development phase may still be suitable in order that
DoD still bear the risk.
Phase III
- Scope of work: the uncertainty of the level of effort
required to manufacture each product is born by the
contractor by his fixed-price bid; this allotment is correct
since most of the engineering and technical uncertainties
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have been resolved by this point and thus it is the
contractor who can control how he manufactures the product.
- Performance of contractor: also born by the
contractor by his fixed-price bid, and rightfully so since
he has the best ability to manage the quality and timeliness
of his work.
- Financial risk: the costs to produce each product are
carried by the contractor in his bid, along the same lines
as the scope of work.
- Technology: even though the contract is normally a
fixed-price contract, it is the government which actually
bears the uncertainty that the technology it has chosen will
perform as desired in deployment situations and in the hands
of the everyday user (as opposed to the performance in a
test/lab situation at the hands of a military test
specialist or engineer). If the product it receives meets
the specifications of the contract, the government must pay
for the product even if it doesn't do what DoD thought it
would. Even if the contract is eventually terminated, the
vendor receives compensation for the costs he has incurred.
In summary, the weapons development business is a very
risky business, and the government recognizes those
uncertainties with the contracts it uses.
4.6 Some Positive and Negative Aspects of the Weapons
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Acquisition Process
Since the focus of this thesis is the environmental
restoration contracting process, it is not necessary to
perform a complete analysis of the weapons acquisition
process and all of its advantages and disadvantages.
Therefore, this section presents only the key aspects of the
weapons development and production system that could be
relevant to environmental remediation contracting methods.
4.6.1 Positive Aspects
There are several positive aspects of the weapons
acquisition process which are worth noting. First, the
results achieved by the industry are a reflection of the
ingenuity and adaptability of the private sector.
Historically, DoD turned to the marketplace when speed and
flexibility were needed to keep pace with technology, and
industry more than met the challenge.
Another beneficial facet of the weapons contracting
process is that it clearly recognizes technical uncertainty.
Although the notion of cost-plus contracts conjures up
images of contractors sucking the government dry, in reality
the contracts play a necessary role in the acquisition
process.
...cost-plus contracts - or, more broadly, cost-
type contracts - continue to survive, because they
provide an incentive to producers in what would
otherwise be too risky a situation - the quest for
advanced technology equipment that has never been
built before in this particular form for a narrow
market (perhaps a single customer) that can, and
does, change its mind. Thus cost-plus contracts
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allow for financing of programs that a private
contractor would not otherwise take on. 7"
During the history of DoD reforms to the acquisition
system, one of the attempts to break free of open-ended
cost-type contracts was the use of incentive-type contracts.
The format for these is much like a guaranteed maximum price
contract in construction, where the contractor gives an
estimated price and a ceiling price, with provisions for
sharing the savings until the ceiling price is reached (at
which time the contractor bears all costs). The contract
for the development of the F-111l fighter aircraft was an
incentive contract, and it was fraught with both technical
problems and cost overruns. 7'
In short, DoD tried to overcome the inherent technical
uncertainties in aircraft development (and resulting cost-
plus contracts) by writing an extremely detailed project
definition package and turning it over to industry on an
incentive contract basis. The downfall for this method was
that the project definition package, despite its
thoroughness, did not predict the inevitable technical
problems.
Given the project's technological risk, writing
such an accurate contract would have required more
perspicacity than anyone possessed...(Defense
Secretary) McNamara and his staff were arguably
"Gregory, p. 69.
"For a complete discussion on this case, the reader is
referred to McNaugher pp. 60-62.
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insensitive to the unpredictability of
technology.e0
The contract between DoD and General Dynamics was confounded
by engineering change proposals, claims and counterclaims.
The result was that technical and design issues became legal
issues which had to be resolved by bureaucrats and lawyers
instead of the technical managers. "The resulting
environment hardly favored the development of sophisticated
weaponry." *-
In the final analysis, the current cost-plus system
recognizes and treats technology risks much more effectively
than incentive or fixed-price contracting systems.
A third positive point about the method used by DoD to
develop its weapons is that it shows the value of prototype
testing during the early stages of development when trying
to predict the likelihood that a new technology will work.
One keen example of this benefit in solving technical
uncertainty was the Pentagon's lightweight fighter fly-off
competition during the 1970s. In a nutshell, instead of
trying to use a specific aircraft program to push defense
contractors into developing the next generation fighter
aircraft (while two multi-billion dollar programs, the F-14
and F-15, were still in full production and nowhere near
obsolete), DoD decided to hold a prototype competition for
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the sake of the technology only. The aircraft which
eventually resulted from this "fly-before-buy" competition
in ideas (the F-16 and F/A-18) were then incorporated into
the more traditional development process and "set the mold
for fighter design all over the world for decades to
follow."- =
What fly-before-buy does for program management is
to knock off the nonsense of paper-cost estimates,
of paper-performance estimates, and get real
hardware into the sky to get hard data. Fly-
before-buy gives some real indications of
manufacturing costs. A prototype injects hard-
nosed experience and realism into a system filled
with computer runs and marketing optimism. Flight
testing demonstrates how accurate fuel-consumption
projections are; it gives a preliminary idea of
reliability, of maintenance manhours; it shows
whether the prototype will deliver on
maneuverability, speed, and the rest of the
performance its designers promised.A 3
Keeping innovative contractors interested and involved
in the development of new weapons is the fourth benefit of
the DoD acquisition system. By having contractors
participate in the conceptual phases of a new program, and
by reimbursing part of their upfront bid-and-proposal and
independent research and development costs, DoD gives
incentives for contractors to work with the Pentagon and
promote their ideas.
Finally, the weapons acquisition process allows for the
selection of the most qualified contractors. Since the
62Gregory, pp. 135-136.
*3 Ibid., p. 141.
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selection criteria include factors other than price, DoD can
consider the firm's past performance and other important
concerns when trying to create a new weapon system.
In summary, the DoD weapons acquisition process has
achieved remarkable success in terms of allocating risk and
in the products and technologies it has created. Since the
linchpin of U. S. strategy has been superior technology, the
process has succeeded in its mission.
4.6.2 Negative Aspects
The extent of the problems in the weapons acquisition
process are too lengthy and detailed to be expressed in full
here. Some of the negative aspects are capsulized below so
that they can be drawn upon in later sections.0 4
Because of the size of the programs and the number of
organizations involved in the decision making, the process
is highly centralized and consensus building is the only way
anything gets accomplished. One has to satisfy the
interests and concerns of Congress, the Office of Management
and Budget (OMB), the DoD senior staff, the particular
service staff, the program management team, the user
commands, and industry itself before any issue is resolved
"For a more comprehensive view of the DoD weapons
acquisition process and its associated ills, the reader is
referred to the books by Fox, Gregory and McNaugher listed in the
bibliography.
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and the process can move.00 As a result, programs lumber
along no matter how urgent the priority.
A second negative aspect of the weapons acquisition
process is that it is highly politicized. The risk
assessment of the perceived national threat and the defense
capabilities needed to respond to that threat is not always
rational. "To be sure, the nation as a whole does not
collectively make risk assessments in some rational sense.
Rather, the political system makes these calculations
implicitly in the context of formulating defense budgets
each year." 66 The ramification is that money may be
allocated on a partisan or emotional basis rather than where
it is most needed or where it can be used most effectively.
One of the biggest criticisms of the DoD weapons
development process is that costs are seemingly
uncontrolled, with overruns being the rule rather than the
exception. The spiralling costs are caused by a number of
factors, some of which are justifiable.
One of the biggest contributors to the ever increasing
costs is the nature of the work and the technical
uncertainty involved. "Technology is not a sure thing. Old
fashion cut-and-try will always be with us, something
engineers understand - but taxpayers do not. A turkey may
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be necessary the first time to produce an eagle the
second."0 7 Sometimes it takes a few failures and a chunk
of money in order to crack a technology barrier.
Another item which adds to the cost problems is the
instability in the funding of the various programs. In both
the development and the production phases, Congress has the
prerogative of terminating funding, reducing the number of
units-bought, or delaying the program for a year or more.
An Air Force study found "funding instability at the top of
the list of reasons why development programs take longer and
cost more - surprisingly ahead of technical problems."**
With the uncertainty in funding or contract renewal for the
next year, the contractor must consider higher contingencies
in his budgeting and there is no real incentive for the
contractor to invest in any long-term cost saving measures.
Costs also escalate because many of the DoD program
managers are not acquisition professionals and do not have
the industrial or management background to properly run
their projects. Most are military officers who rotate
through the Pentagon after having completed operational
tours throughout their careers.' 9 Lower level managers
also lack in their experience and training. It has been
reported that during the proposal evaluation process,
97Gregory, p. 130.
seIbid., p. 146.
'9Fox, pp. 151-156.
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government personnel have been known to reveal to a
proposer, by offering suggestions for improvements to his
particular proposal, the technical and design approaches of
a competitor. Industry considers this technical leveling
process as unethical.' o Acquisition personnel at all
levels contribute to the cost problems.
One way Congress has tried to cap the expanding costs
and exert more control over the process is through detailed
legislation. This "solution" has actually become another
negative aspect of the DoD weapons procurement process.
Instead of providing guidelines, balancing national
priorities, and allocating funds, Congress has injected
itself into the process by writing laws which detail
particular actions that must occur in specific weapons
contracts, which redirect programs from one district to
another, and which require voluminous reports back to
Congress.
Good regulation helps good managers, but weapons
acquisition regulation has been pursuing an
impossible dream: legislating perfection. Driven
essentially by Congress, regulation and reform in
the Pentagon have pushed paperwork and procedure
to prevent every possible mistake. But this has
not worked. It could not. No regulation can
create good management or top-notch people. "'
Program managers, unable to freely exercise their authority
or judgement (and fearful of making an error while under the
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magnifying glass of Congress), have been more likely to
defer action and take the safest path in order to comply
with the law, regardless of the results achieved.'2
In the cases where fixed-price contracts have been
used, there is an additional conflict with this excessive
amount of procurement legislation and regulation. The
customer, DoD, can direct, approve or disapprove particular
contractor actions and exercise detailed management over a
program, yet DoD does not share in the financial success or
failure of the contractor's performance because it expects
the contractor to bear all the risks inherent in a fixed-
price contract.' 3 There is a natural tension created when
the government wants the contractor to commit to a fixed
price and then also wants to control how he executes the
contract. You can't have it both ways.
One final negative aspect of the weapons development
process is that it has fostered the consolidation of the
defense industry. The large program dollar values, the
management systems and engineering expertise required by the
government's contracts, and the convoluted regulation
schemes all contribute to the formation of large,
specialized contractors who deal almost exclusively with
DoD. As a result, obtaining competition for particular
projects becomes more difficult because only a few firms
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have the ability to survive in this environment.
4.7 Chapter Sumary
The design and manufacture of military weapon systems
is a complex, expensive process that only the most
technologically advanced firms can master. The current
"weapons system" approach to the procurement of military
hardware from the private sector evolved from its origins in
the 1920s, and changes to the process have almost always
been driven by advancements in technology and changes in the
nature of the weapons themselves. Although the process is
far from perfect, some good does come from this flawed
process. In particular, the DoD weapons development and
production system delivers a high quality product that has
done its job.
...in a world where everyone's weapons are growing
more complex and expensive, U. S. weapons often
stand out as top performers. The acquisition
process seems to do tolerably well what it was
established to do, namely, arm the nation's forces
with weapons technologically superior to those of
its chief adversary, the Soviet Union. 94
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5RECOMMENDATIONS FOR THE ENVIRONMENTAL CONTRACTING PROCESS
5.1 General
If one purchases standard items - cars, trucks, or
other commercial products - a fixed-price contract
is usually an appropriate substitute for day-to-
day management of the project. If one purchases a
large custom-made R&D or production program,
however, where changes in schedules, cost and
sDecifications occur as frequently as once a week
(or, more likely, once a day), a fixed-price
contract is inappropriate and therefore no
substitute for day-to-day evaluations and
negotiations between the buyer and the seller.95
(emphasis added)
Many situations encountered in the environmental
restoration process require flexibility, innovation, and the
capacity to create a custom-made solution. As argued in
Chapter 3, the military's most common system for contracting
for environmental remediation work does not meet these
requirements as well as it could. In addition, the
exorbitant costs the nation as a whole and DoD in particular
face in cleaning up hazardous waste sites are partially
driven by two factors: a misallocation of risk in the
contracting process and poor (i.e., inefficient)
technologies.
What, then, can the military do to improve on its
contracting practices in an effort to more effectively
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attack the environmental problems of the coming decades?
One possible solution is to improve the contracting
process so that risk is more effectively allocated. This
shift would not only be more efficient in terms of risk
management and pricing, it should also encourage the
development of innovative technologies. Both of these
improvements would lead to lower overall costs for the
hazardous waste cleanup effort.
Since the weapons acquisition process must treat
similar conditions of uncertainty and has managed to do so
while successfully developing new technologies, DoD should
attempt to capture the benefits of its experience. This
does not imply that the weapons acquisition process should
serve as a model. One normally associates military weapons
procurement with terms like gold-plated, scandal,
corruption, or porkbarrel.
In the minds of much of the citizenry, the
Pentagon procurement system is manned by fast-buck
artists, incompetents, or deranged Dr.
Strangelove's who, when they lack weapons of mass
destruction to tinker with, design $600 hammers or
$5,000 coffeepots.'*
Although this perception is not truly indicative of the
situation in Washington, it hints that there are as many
lessons to be learned about what NOT to do as there are what
TO do when structuring a procurement system. Those who are
responsible for managing DoD's environmental restoration
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programs should try to glean from the weapons procurement
methodology the basic principles which might solve some of
the deficiencies in the environmental restoration
contracting process.
This chapter highlights some of those lessons, then
applies them by describing one possible contracting
structure. The hindrances to applying the lessons learned
are also presented. The chapter concludes with a brief
consideration of the challenges facing DoD personnel at the
local installation level who are trying to get the
environmental restoration work done.
5.2 Lessons from Weapons Contracting to be Applied to
Remediation Contracting
This section states, in a generic sense, the lessons to
be learned from the weapons contracting process. Those who
are involved with the environmental contracting process
might use some of these principles to solve the particular
problems they confront.
5.2.1 What to Do
- DoD should recall that in the weapons industry
innovation outpaced the contracting changes and forced a
reaction. The prudent manager should foresee the need for
change and help to shape the outcome.
- DoD should continue to contract with the private
sector for environmental restoration services in order to
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take advantage of industry's ability to respond to change
and to innovate. There is no need to establish a government
agency to create the new technologies or to perform the site
remediations. Government's role should be to establish and
monitor a system that uses the private sector.
- DoD must be willing to use flexible contracts where
uncertainty is high with regards to the scope of work or the
performance of the technology. This may include contracts
in which the government absorbs some of the financial and
technical risks.
- As an owner who must rely on multiple contractors to
get a restoration completed, DoD should make every effort to
foster teamwork and reduce disputes. The structuring of the
contracts and the general attitude of the owner both play a
big part in reducing the costs of disputes or litigation,
and DoD has control over these factors.
- DoD must recognize how to develop new remediation
technologies. It is unreasonable to expect the current
contracting system or any alternative procurement method for
a particular project to be the font of new technologies.
Contractors can't afford the risk and the results are too
narrow. Instead, DoD should develop a system that allows
vendors to test their ideas under full-scale, real-world
conditions (not just a bench scale test on selected
contaminants at a controlled site), and partially reimburses
them for their efforts. The lightweight fighter competition
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of the 1970s was an example of a competition for the sake of
the technology alone, outside the window of a particular
development program. The results of this fly-off were
captured and matured into two very successful aircraft.
While independent research and development has
been attacked in Congress as a gift to
contractors, and by antidefense groups as a system
whereby the government finances contractors to
develop hardware that they then sell to the
military at fat prices, defenders can point to
this case [the F-16 and F/A-18). 7
- As new technologies emerge, DoD must pay attention to
how to apply the technologies on particular projects. The
government should use performance and mission oriented specs
to encourage adaptation. DoD must structure its contracts
to allow for change on individual projects. In addition,
the contracting environment must be one which allows
multiple advanced technologies to come together, much like a
situation where a firm such as General Dynamics draws
subsystems from the most creative and advanced vendors and
then interfaces those components with its own work.
- In the quest for innovation in either the general
sense or for a particular project, DoD must absolutely
recognize that technical uncertainty is high and treat the
situation accordingly. If DoD wants modernization, it must
be willing to assume some of the risks inherent in breaking
technical barriers.
- On a more mundane contracting level, DoD should
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consider factors other than price when choosing a contractor
for any step in the restoration process. When evaluating
contractor proposals, government personnel must keep
proposals confidential or DoD will lose credibility with the
industry. For those contractors who are selected and who
perform well, DoD should find a way to recognize outstanding
contractors and keep them interested in doing more work.
This requires that the good contractors remain involved in
the decision making processes and that they remain solvent
while sharing in this risky business with DoD.
- The government must make every effort to fund
projects fully and stably, including reserves for
contingencies which thus allow prudent management.
- Since DoD cannot control the total funds Congress
appropriates for environmental restoration each year, DoD
must work to allocate the funds it gets in a rational
manner. The Defense Priority Model mentioned in Chapter 2
should help DoD do this.
- DoD and the nation as a whole must try to keep the
environmental restoration process rational, not political or
emotional. The fact that each individual project is
essentially a "local" project and that the environmental
restoration industry is still fragmented works to diminish
the political lobbying effects. Only education and trust
can diminish the emotional facet.
- Finally, to make any of these ideas work well, DoD
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needs to ensure it has created a working environment which
attracts high quality people and rewards them for their
excellence in government service.
5.2.2 What Not to Do
- DoD should not attempt to use any particular
contracting method or choose any restoration technology
"just because it's the way we've always done these things."
Judgement and consideration of the individual circumstances
are the most important roles of the manager.
- The government must not create a contracting
environment full of waste in overpriced/gold-plated
specifications. One should not create a system where higher
costs mean higher profits for the contractor unless there is
a tight but fair control mechanism for evaluating the
validity of costs.
- If DoD seeks value for its money and also seeks
innovative ideas, then it should not use sole-source
solicitations which prevent any remnant of competition.
- The government should not make a contractor bear the
risk of technology itself, but just his performance of that
technology.
- DoD must not seek to overregulate the restoration
process or they will stifle it:
For years, acquisition managers have asked the
customer to give industry a performance
specification, to tell industry in broad terms
what it wants, and then let competitors vie to see
who can do the best design and manufacturing job.
But instead, government exerts more and more
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control over more and more detail of how industry
does a technical job, through incessant reviews,
regulations, and paperwork.'0
In situations were DoD is using fixed-price contracts, the
problem of regulation is further exacerbated because it is
counterproductive to used fixed-price contracts when the
customer (DoD) has so much control over the contractor's
means and methods.
- To take advantage on the knowledge of the people in
the field and closest to the individual projects and
problems, DoD should not allow the environmental restoration
process to become overly centralized.
- Finally, DoD must not create a "defense-environmental
complex" of a few megacontractors. Most of the negative
aspects of the weapons acquisition process stem from power,
greed and politics.
5.3 Defining the "Ideal" Remediation Contracting Package
This section attempts to apply some of the lessons
learned by outlining one possible contracting situation.
Since some of the same players under weapons contracting are
now getting into the environmental business, some of the
changes to the process lend themselves nicely to the market
which is being called upon to contract with DoD.
By no means should this application be considered 'the
definitive answer.' No single "ideal" procurement package
9'Ibid., pp. 200-201.
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could ever hope to incorporate every one of the principles
of Section 5.2 or pretend to apply to every situation
encountered in the field. To make matters worse, one still
has to consider the real world when outlining an alternative
method. (Section 5.4 injects some of this realism). What
senior DoD environmental managers can do is create a system
that helps foster a corporate mentality of innovation and
willingness to change.
5.3.1 Individual Projects
One contracting combination which would recognize when
uncertainty is high and also encourage innovation is a cost-
plus-award-fee contract for the completion of the "study"
portions of the project (the PA/SI, RI/FS and writing of the
ROD), followed by a design-build contract with a new
contractor for the execution of the project (RD/RA). This
design-build contract would be a cost-plus-fixed-fee
contract which would be converted to a fixed-price incentive
(firm target) contract. The procurements with both of the
firms would be negotiated, not bid.
The contract for the study should be awarded and
administered by one of the service's regional level
engineering offices in consultation with the local activity
where the project occurs. This would ensure that the
government has adequate expertise to evaluate the firm's
proposal, experience with or access to cost information that
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would allow them review and audit the contractor's progress,
and sufficient technical expertise to make decisions with
respect to the RI/FS and ROD. This cost-plus-award-fee
contract would offer the following advantages:
- the cost reimbursement nature of the contract
counters the uncertainty about the level of effort required
to collect data, to characterize the site or to evaluate the
alternative technologies during the FS
- the award-fee (in which the government evaluates the
contractor with respect to cost, schedule and quality of
work) can be weighted to emphasize the most important aspect
of the project and offers an incentive to the engineering
firm to control costs without cutting corners on the work
necessary to perform a proper study
- because the contract is a negotiated procurement, DoD
can consider factors other than price when awarding the
contract
- the analysis performed by the contractor when
evaluating alternatives and preparing the ROD is not biased
by the firm's own design capabilities because the contractor
would not be allowed to compete for the follow-on design-
build contract (i.e., he is free to recommend any
alternative)
The design-build contract for the remedial design and
remedial action steps should be awarded and administered by
the local activity's construction office with the assistance
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of the regional level engineering office. This too would be
a negotiated procurement, where competing design-build
teams' proposals would be evaluated and ranked considering
experience on previous work as a team, qualifications of the
individual members of the design-build team, financial
stability of the firms, bonding capacity, experience (either
separately or together) on other DoD work, proposed methods
of design/project management, adherence of proposed
technologies to the Record of Decision, Work Plan for the
remedial design, proposed subcontractors, and so on.
Negotiations would begin with the most advantageous
offerer in an attempt to execute a bilateral cost-plus-
fixed-fee agreement. Included in that agreement would be a
provision to convert to a fixed-price incentive (firm
target) contract when most of the technical and scope
uncertainties are resolved. At that point, the design-build
team would be reimbursed for its allowable costs and paid
its flat fee for the work to date, and then the target cost,
target price, and price ceiling would be set for the
remainder of the contract. This point of conversion could
vary from project to project, but because of the design-
build nature of the work would probably be after the early
stages of "construction" but while some design details
remained.
If for some reason the two parties could not reach a
CPFF agreement, negotiations would begin with the second-
-106-
ranked proposer. Upon award of a design-build contract, the
successful team would begin the remedial design and remedial
action.
This contracting arrangement would offer the following
advantages:
- the cost reimbursement nature of the initial contract
counters the uncertainty about the level of effort required
to design an acceptable solution and the uncertainty in
testing particular technologies under the actual site
conditions. It also reduces the risk to the RD designer if
the data gathered by the study engineering firm turns out to
be inadequate or flawed.
- the fixed-fee and conversion features diminish the
possibility of gold-plating because increased costs do not
result in increased profits (note that unlike many cost-type
contracts in the private sector, cost-plus contracts under
the FAR do not permit the fee to be a fixed percentage of
costs; the fee is negotiated and fixed at the inception of
the contract, but may be adjusted as a result of changes in
the work to be performed under the contract9")
- because of the fixed-price incentive contract, the
final price of the project is somewhat constrained but still
offers some flexibility for contingencies. Also, the
targets are set after meaningful work at the site has begun
(whereas incentive-type contracts which are applied when
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uncertainty is high result in massively detailed contracts
that stifle technology and limit flexibility in handling
changes in a fluid environment).
- because the contract is a negotiated procurement, DoD
can consider factors other than price when awarding the
contract
To traditional DoD construction experts, the notion of
combining the design and construction phases of a project
makes them nervous.
Design-build contracting is often dismissed out of
hand due to perceived "conflict of interest"
between the designers and builders (fear of "gold-
plating"). However, there are times when design-
build is the most cost-effective method of
procurement. For example, when recompeting
between phases, the RA (construction) contractor
may not have a proprietary technology available to
the RD (design) contractor. This almost assures
an adverse cost/schedule impact.100
However, design-build has begun to appear in the typical
building construction setting, even for somewhat complex
facilities such as industrial, power and process related
facilities2 02 . Thus, conversion to the use of this
method may be easier for DoD than it initially seems. Some
of the positive aspects of facility design-build would also
be beneficial in the environmental restoration process. For
10oGrant S. Bowers. A Contract Management Guide for Air
Force Environmental Restoration. Wright-Patterson Air Force
Base, Ohio: Thesis submitted to the Air Force Institute of
Technology Air University, September 1991, p. 141.
2OLJacques R. Courtillet. "Have You Considered
Design/Build?" Navy Civil Engineer. Vol. XXX, Issue 3, Fall
1991/Winter 1992, p. 18.
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example:
- "Use of design/build maximizes the use of
'constructability' principles, which, as defined by the
Construction Industry Institute, are the 'optimum use of
construction knowledge and experience in planning,
design/engineering, procurement and field operations to
achieve overall project objectives.'"' 0 2
"Application of these (constructability) principles
in a design/build environment leads to the use of innovative
building products, systems and methods of fabrication and
construction... " 1 3o (emphasis added)
- an atmosphere of teamwork is fostered among the
designer, the constructor and the owner
- "...major advantages that can benefit the Navy
include the reduction in management time (especially at the
construction office) and the ability to capitalize on the
construction industry's working knowledge of state, local
and other building codes and standards. Field changes from
errors, omissions and inconsistencies in the design are
essentially eliminated."1 0 4
In summary, there may be situations where flexibility
and innovation are required to complete an environmental
restoration project, and alternative contracting methods may
10 2 1bid., p. 18.
lo3Ibid., p. 18.
x0 4 Ibid., p. 19.
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be more suitable than traditional methods.
5.3.2 Research and Development
In addition to participation in centralized research
and development programs such as the Superfund Innovative
Technology Evaluation (SITE) Program and its own
Installation Restoration Technology Coordinating Committee
(IRTCC), DoD could stimulate innovative technologies through
its contracting procedures. By allowing certain reasonable
"independent research and development" costs to be allowable
costs under the cost-plus contracts, technology developers
would have a risk-free incentive to experiment with ideas
that may not turn out to be applicable to the particular
project they are working on but which might eventually show
promise.
Such reimbursements would decentralize a portion of the
R&D effort and allow a broader span of ideas to be tested.
Hopefully, this would lead to an increase in the nation's
environmental restoration technology base.
5.4 Real-World Barriers and Pitfalls
Every suggestion to change an existing system comes
with certain caveats. The recommendations of Sections 5.2
and 5.3 deserve a "sanity check" to make sure that one
understands the barriers to implementation of, and the
potential pitfalls of, a more liberal environmental
contracting process.
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The first barrier to implementation faced by DoD is in
defining its strategic goal in the environmental restoration
contracting process. Is the goal to create a system which
will, over the long haul, most effectively cleanup its own
sites by allowing the private sector to innovate and
function as a key member of the remediation team, or is the
goal of the contracting system to drive down costs for each
particular restoration project? It can be argued that DoD
does partially recognize the importance of innovation, for
the Navy/Marine Corps IR Manual states:
This guidance should not be taken as a replacement
for well-informed judgement or innovative
solutions and approaches to adapt the IR Program
to the novel characteristics of a particular site,
the needs of the local populace, or the overall
mission of the Department of the Navy.105
However, the current contracting process still seems to be
geared to a low-bid construction mentality.
Another indicator that promoting innovation may still
not be hot on the minds of DoD remediation managers is in
its priorities for its IR funds. The Navy/Marine Corps IR
Manual lists the categories of work for various IR
activities and classifies them in importance as Priority 1,
2 or 3. Among the activities with the lowest priority is
"research, development and demonstration (RD&D) which has
broad applicability and high potential to reduce costs or
o10 Navy/Marine Corps IR Manual, p. xi.
-111-
improve the pace or quality of work." 1n 0 With the vast
majority of the remediation work being in Priority 1
activities such as 'projects on the NPL,' it is doubtful
that R&D will carry much weight.
In the end it is easy to see that changing the current
contracting structure would require an increased emphasis on
innovation over cost and a slight shift in the corporate
mentality of DoD restoration leaders.
A second barrier to implementation of an alternative
procurement system is that the "naysayers" who are used to
their tried and true methods are quick to point out the
mistakes that happen under any new process.
...in implementing these new and innovative
procurement methods we must always maintain a
level playing field for all participants, use good
judgement, pay prudent attention to monetary
considerations and always be cognizant of the
perception of the taxpayer. We must never forget
that we are stewards of the public trust and any
experience which is bad, or even less than good,
will cause the critics to rise up and cause
retrenchment of the old ways.Lo 7
Along these same lines is a pitfall that some will view
the development of new technologies as a waste of time,
effort and money. The desire to "make something happen"
might lead to the selection of an expedient solution instead
LOIbid., p. 8-3.
107Henry J. Hatch, Lieutenant General, USA. Which
Procurement and Contracting Methods Reduce Disputes? Speech
delivered at the Construction Disputes Resolution Conference,
Hyatt Regency Capital Hill, Washington, D. C., November 7, 1991,
p. 11.
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of a more effective, but unproven, technology. One should
not be too anxious to eliminate a technology option before
it has a chance to prove itself.
The appearance of waste is unavoidable in a
process so rife with uncertainty. Wrong turns
will be taken, to be exposed only by testing and
further development. Yet to see this occurrence
as waste is to take a short-term view of a process
that can only be properly evaluated over the long
haul. The danger that haunts R&D, especially in
early stages, is that in trying to save money
early in a project developers will make bad
choices based on misleading early data. Having
eliminated interesting new ideas prematurely, they
will wind up wasting more money later on. The
conundrum of R&D, it might be said, is that unless
one is willing to waste money early, one is likely
to waste much more money later. Good R&D can
survive only in an environment that tolerates a
certain amount of messiness and error early in
order to avoid it later.c10
In a demanding military environment where perfection is
expected and mistakes are not tolerated, the previous quote
should be taken to heart by every DoD environmental
restoration project manager (and should be posted in their
bosses' officest). Obviously, there comes a point where one
is pouring good money after bad. With the federal
government spending some $1.5 billion annually on
environmental research and development,30 ' there is a
10 sMcNaugher, p. 5.
210 National Technology Initiative: Protecting-and Investing
In-the Environment. Unnumbered handout produced jointly by the
U. S. Departments of Commerce, Energy, and Transportation and the
National Aeronautics and Space Administration and distributed at
the National Technology Initiative Conference, Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, February 12,
1992.
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potential for abuse or mismanagement. However, the
decisions about the development of technology should be made
in a rational manner. Also, one cannot forget that the
contracting system must be structured such that those
innovative choices can emerge in the first place.
The broad issues of cost and the limitations on
resources available for environmental restoration work
present several intertwined challenges which serve as yet
another barrier to a contracting methodology which is based
on anything other than low price. The contract vehicles
must not reward increasing costs with increasing profits.
DoD project managers must appreciate that they have to
complete their projects with a finite pot of money. If
cost-type contracts, which are founded in trust and teamwork
between the contracting parties, are employed, there is a
danger of DoD remediation project managers getting too
familiar and "going native" to the contractor's way of
thinking. At the same time, the possibility exists that an
unsuspecting or unknowledgeable government employee will be
taken advantage of by a dubious contractor.
The way to avoid these pitfalls is to train the people
who are responsible for monitoring the contractor's costs
and provide those managers with enough oversight to ensure
that they are using their resources wisely. The balance
comes in avoiding the "overregulation" syndrome. The other
way to deter any less than honest practices by a contractor
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is to reward contractors who do a fair, honest and proper
job by giving them more work. Market mechanisms can quickly
weed out those who do not perform in an open and above-board
manner.
Another barrier to the implementation of an alternative
strategy is the number of codes, regulations and laws which
must be considered when contracting for environmental
services in the government sector. Any remediation program,
public or private, is subject to the ever-changing laws
under CERCLA and RCRA. DoD contracting officers must also
abide by the Federal Acquisition Regulations (FAR), which on
one hand state that designers are not allowed to construct
the projects they design, but on the other hand state that
deviations to the FAR may be granted
...when necessary to meet the specific needs and
requirements of each agency. The development and
testing of new techniques and methods of
acquisition should not be stifled simply because
such action would require a FAR deviation."o
Properly classifying the nature of environmental work as
'design,' 'construction,' or 'service' also makes
application of the FAR difficult. Still other laws, such as
those covering minority or small disadvantaged business
quotas, local resident hiring quotas, or prevailing wages,
show that the government uses contracting with the private
sector as part of a larger socio-economic program. Hence,
for the sake of these other goals DoD must often do things
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in a contracting situation that are not necessarily the most
efficient. This is not to argue that the socio-economic
goals are flawed; rather, one must realize that these and
all other regulations, rules and laws serve as a barrier to
enacting an "ideal" process.
One final caveat: any argument for changing the DoD
contracting system is moot if DoD does not address the long-
term and latent liability issues that environmental firms
face. These issues not only distort the normal risk
allotments and tendencies in the contracting arena, they
also constrain the market and the number of eligible
players. DoD should consider changing its stance on
indemnification of contractors and provide some rational but
limited amount of indemnification so that the reforms to the
contracting process described in this thesis, or any other
proposed reforms, can flourish.
5.5 Administration of Remediation Contracts at the Local
Installation Level
Because the majority of the effort expended in the
remediation of DoD sites takes place in and around the
installation that contains the hazardous waste site,
government personnel at the local level (not the Pentagon
level) are the key figures in the institution of a solid
contracting system. "Government managers are needed to play
major roles in shaping the effectiveness and efficiency of
-116-
the acquisition process. " "' These on-scene leaders must
set the standards for the quality of the program, decide on
the contracting methods, inspect the work, and so on. It is
incumbent upon them to be efficient and effective and not to
abdicate that responsibility to a fixed-price contract.
To be proficient in an acquisition position, one must
be trained and experienced. A number of the problems with
the weapons acquisition process have been traced back to the
quality of the personnel charged with running the programs.
Unfortunately, just as the environmental restoration
industry has found itself lacking in the number of people
with the necessary skills to execute this new style of work,
so too has DoD.
The government must make certain that its local
personnel are properly trained in the principles of
contracting and that they understand the precepts behind an
effective procurement. To carry out the kind of contracting
arrangement described earlier, DoD personnel must have the
savvy to recognize good contractor performance; they also
have to have the tools to reward that performance as an
incentive to the environmental contracting community.
To survive in the environmental restoration contracting
domain, local personnel also must have a solid foundation in
the legal aspects of their business.
As in other construction work, the ROICC needs to
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ensure that the contractor performs the work in
accordance with the plans and specifications. It
must be remembered that the plans, specifications
and, in some cases, the construction schedule,
have specific legally binding measures which must
be followed. 1 2
Finally, each local office should have a cadre of
talent with respect to the technical and engineering aspects
of the work. Not everyone needs to be an expert, but a
corps of people need to be wise enough to communicate
effectively with the environmental industry and to evaluate
the performance of those paid professionals.
How can DoD attract such high caliber acquisition
personnel? As with any organization, DoD has to offer
career paths which provide challenging assignments,
recognition for dedicated performance, and opportunities for
promotion and advancement.
Creating a team of environmental contracting
specialists at each DoD installation would be both
impractical and impossible. Fortunately, the services seem
to have chosen a tack which will allow them to meet the
needs of most installations and hopefully avoid the charges
of mismanagement that have been leveled against other
agencies (such as EPA) and their contracting
abilities.11 3 By using base engineers and construction
11 2Remedial Action..., p. 2-4.
11 As detailed in Implementation of the Superfund
Alternative Remedial Contracting Strategy (ARCS): Report of the
Administrator's Task Force. Washington, D.C.: U. S.
Environmental Protection Agency, November 1991.
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offices to contract for environmental work (as opposed to
using the purchasing offices of the base logistics
department), DoD has tapped a resource which already has
experience in contracting, law and engineering, albeit in
more traditional building construction. As time progresses,
these personnel can refine their skills to include those
necessary to manage an environmental construction job. Part
of that refinement is, of course, the recognition that
environmental restoration jobs are truly different from
typical construction projects.
5.6 Chapter Summary
Through its proven results in contracting out for high
technology weapons, DoD has served the nation's interests
and carried out its strategy. DoD's next great challenge is
to try to learn from their successes and failures and
capture the best ideas for use in environmental contracting.
No single contracting method can address every
situation that might be encountered during environmental
restoration. Each situation requires educated thought and
seasoned judgement, and there will always be a number of
obstacles which will hinder the process. In the end, the
burden for improving the environmental restoration
contracting process falls on the government personnel at the
local installations.
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6CLOSING
6.1 Conclusions
Through these and other activities, we have made
significant headway in building an environmental
ethic within DoD. The perseverance and commitment
of our personnel, from the installation level up
to this Headquarters, have enabled us to lead the
way among Federal agencies in the investigation
and cleanup of our facilities. This continuing
dedication to duty, both in the defense of our
national security and in the protection of our
environment, will enable us to meet the challenges
ahead.
Deputy Asst. Sec. of Def. (Environment) Thomas
Bacall4
Why try to improve the environmental contracting
process? Won't the existing procurement methods and
restoration technologies eventually get the job done?
The answer is yes, maybe, but more efficient
contracting leads to a better allocation of resources.
Altering the process can also result in the development of
new technologies which in turn will lead to faster, more
effective, and cheaper projects; thus, more cleanups can be
completed with less drain on the nation's resources.
Doesn't the country run the risk of "wasting" a lot of
money while searching for improved contracting mechanisms
and innovative technologies?
Call it an investment in the future. DoD "wasted" a
-
2 14DERP Annual Report, p. v.
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lot of defense dollars while researching and developing its
weapons, but look what it got in return. The U. S.
undoubtedly has produced the most advanced technology
weapons in the world, which in turn has furthered many of
this nation's goals, saved lives, made for smaller fighting
forces and brought an end to the longest conflict in the
nation's history: the Cold War. If the U. S. seeks to be a
worldleader in solving environmental problems, then it must
be willing to pay a premium for the advancement of
remediation technology.
Why should DoD be so concerned with solving a problem
that is being tackled by private sector industries in this
country, by multiple U. S. government agencies, and by
countries around the world?
Because of the military's national security mission.
DoD is still the instrument of the nation's policy makers
and the defender of the nation's well-being. With its
mission-oriented mentality, the military can take charge in
experimenting with these improvements (and some argue that
the Army Corps of Engineers is ideally suited for this
mission and should be tasked to do so'5). The
engineering nature of the problem makes DoD the most capable
U. S. agency at this time to take the lead in promoting
technology for the public good. The government would be
31 OThe reader is referred in particular to the MIT theses by
Rossi and Dornstauder.
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wise to use the military's traditional strength in
contracting to set the pace for the nation.
The Department of Defense has had some success using
the traditional method for contracting for environmental
restoration services. However, since this type of work is
still relatively new and expected to grow dramatically in
the coming years, it would be prudent for DoD to consider
alternative contracting methods such as design-build in
order to obtain the highest quality and the most value for
its contracting dollars. The changes DoD must undertake
include both its particular contracting procedures and its
corporate mentality.
Returning to industry the job that is industry's -
innovative design and quality manufacturing - and
returning to the program manager the job that is
the program manager's - sound decision making and
accountability - are complementary sides of the
same structure. These are matters of style rather
than regulation.21
There won't ever be a perfect solution. People are
involved. Priorities change. The level of knowledge is
changing. Funds are limited. Engineering solutions always
carry a range of uncertainty.
There will be obstacles to overcome. Critics will be
quick to point out any increases in contract prices, and in
reality there is no way to respond to them by showing them a
rapid payback; the benefits of progressive technology will
be spread over many separate projects and will be reaped
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gradually over time. In addition, it will be difficult to
measure the internal effectiveness of any changes made
because DoD is a bureaucracy which does not operate on a
clear-cut or measurable basis such as profit.
The key is a willingness to undertake constant self-
examination and improvement. Call it total quality
management (TQM) or any other buzzword which fits.
6.2 Areas for Further Research
- A survey and analysis of completed DoD restoration
projects, including location, remediation technologies
employed, contract types used, competition and award
procedures, original project estimates versus actual costs,
claims encountered, etc.
- Drafting of a complete "model" restoration
contracting package utilizing some of the principles
outlined in this thesis, but also including all required FAR
clauses, variations to the FAR that must be generated,
proposed fee schedules, profit rates, negotiation or bid
procedures to be employed, etc.
- A comparative analysis of using cost-type contracts
for environmental restoration projects versus using firm
fixed-price contracts in conjunction with "partnering"
concepts for contract execution and dispute resolution.
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